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ESSAYS ON STRATEGIC VOTING
Sun-Tak Kim, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2012
This dissertation investigates strategic voting from two perspectives. The second chapter
studies a theory of electoral competition in the presence of strategic forward-looking voters
while the third chapter experimentally tests a rational voter model under alternative voting
institutions that may be employed in jury trials.
In the second chapter, I study a spatial model of two-party electoral competition in
which the final policy outcome can be different from electoral promises. The policy outcome
depends in part on electoral promise, but also reflects the bargaining process between the
winning and losing party whose outcome can be anticipated by strategic forward-looking
voters. Unlike the prediction of the Median Voter Theorem which holds with the coincidence
of electoral promises and policy outcomes, I find that parties have incentives to distinguish
themselves from one another in the election with the consideration of policy concession that
might result from post-electoral bargaining.
In the third chapter, I report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary
voting mechanisms. Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have important im-
plications for strategic decisions in terms of both voting and abstention, and I find strong
support for these theoretical predictions in the experimental data. Voters are able to adapt
their strategic voting behavior or their participation decisions to the different voting mecha-
nisms in such a way as to make the efficiency differences between these mechanisms negligible.
I argue that this finding may account for the co-existence of these two voting mechanisms
in nature.
In conclusion, I give a brief description of a way to extend the experimental study in the
iv
third chapter by considering alternative mechanisms to obtain private information relevant
to voting decisions.
Keywords: Strategic Voting, Spatial Model, Post-Electoral Bargaining, Platform
Divergence, Mixed-strategy Equilibrium, Voting Behavior, Voting Mechanisms,
Condorcet Jury Model, Information Aggregation, Information Acquisition,
Laboratory Experiments.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies rational behavior and strategic interaction in collective decision-
making problems. The applications are to elections or voting in committees. The focus is
on understanding the implications of rationality for the outcomes of group decisions.
Various aspects of strategic voting are investigated in this dissertation. First, I study
the theoretical model of spatial political competition in a rational expectations framework.
Voters are postulated to anticipate correctly the possibility of post-electoral political bar-
gaining and the resulting final policy outcome from the electoral choices of political parties,
and political parties take this into account when they announce electoral promises. Second,
I use laboratory experiments to compare (compulsory vs. voluntary) voting mechanisms in a
situation where rational voters are assumed to vote only to affect the outcome (pivotal voter
model). This implies that voters infer additional information from others’ (equilibrium) be-
havior and voting rules, and weigh it against their private information. Finally, I discuss a
way to extend this experimental works to study the incentives of rational voters to optimally
invest in and use costly information.
In the second chapter titled “Policy Divergence with Post-Electoral Bargaining,” I con-
sider the spatial model of two-party (leftist vs. rightist) political competition with a depar-
ture that the final policy to be implemented by a winning party can be different from his
announced platform in the election. The winning and opposing party are assumed to engage
in bargaining over the final policy after the election. I model the post-electoral process as
a Nash bargaining game in which the disagreement payoffs are determined by the electoral
platforms and the opposing party’s vote share. Voters are assumed to be rational in the
sense that they take into account the implications of the announced platforms for the final
policy. With this bargaining protocol and forward-looking voters, the two political parties
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are shown to choose extremely divergent electoral platforms in any symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium if the opposing party has sufficiently large bargaining power. In a political en-
vironment where the latter party cannot have large enough bargaining power, parties are
shown to mix over separate sets of policies, again diverging in their electoral platforms at
any (realized) strategy profile of mixed equilibrium.
In the third chapter titled “Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting: An Experimental
Study,” I consider two-state and two-alternative voting with private information. Voters have
common values (like the jury who want to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent), and
receive independent and noisy signals about the true state of nature (guilty vs. innocent).
Here, we assume there are two signals one of which is regarded as correct in each state.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) points out that voting according to signal (sincere voting)
may not be strategically optimal if voting is mandatory (compulsory voting). However,
Krishna and Morgan (2012) recently showed that sincere voting can be incentive compatible
with endogenously determined participation rates under voluntary voting. Sincere voting
is incentive compatible only if the probability of sincere voting is different between the
groups with different signals (types). This necessarily implies that there exists a type whose
probability of sincere voting is strictly less than one. Equilibrium analysis shows that this
type mixes between sincere and insincere voting under compulsory voting while he mixes
between sincere voting and abstention under voluntary voting. In the experimental data, I
find strong evidence that subjects employ different mixing schemes under the different voting
mechanisms (or treatments).
In the same setting of common-value jury trials, we can alternatively model that voters
should expend cost to obtain (noisy) private signals instead of receiving them freely as in the
third chapter. An interesting question in this case concerns the optimal voting mechanism.
The standard model of jury voting with exogenous information predicts that the efficiency of
group decision increases unambiguously with group size. However, once information acqui-
sition becomes a costly decision, there is an important free-riding consideration that implies
the existence of an optimal group size beyond which the efficiency of group decision declines.
Future experimental tests of this hypothesis and the other about the optimal voting rule
(e.g. majority rule) are discussed in the conclusion.
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2.0 POLICY DIVERGENCE WITH POST-ELECTORAL BARGAINING
The Hotelling-Downs model of spatial (political) competition assumes that the platforms the
politicians announce prior to an election will be the final policies they subsequently enact
once in office. However, since voters have preferences not over electoral platforms but over
final policy outcomes, the equivalence of electoral platforms and final policies is assumed for
analytical tractability at the expense of realism, as pointed out by Banks (1990). In this
chapter, we assume that the final policy outcome is determined not by the winner’s electoral
platform but by a bargaining process between the winning party and his opponent. The
central question is how this concern for post-electoral bargaining affects the incentives of
political parties competing in an election.
According to Ansolabehere (2006), the spatial theory of voting has been extremely suc-
cessful because of its analytical simplicity. The simplicity of spatial models then follows from
the very assumption of equivalence between electoral platforms and final policies. Although
it seems to be realistic, eliminating the assumption of precommitment (to platforms) has
proven to bring about a significant challenge for the development of alternative models of
political competition. If politicians are not fully bound to their electoral promises, then
can they say anything in political campaigns? What is the relationship between electoral
platforms and final policies in the absence of full commitment to the former? At the other
extreme, campaign promises can be alternatively modeled as cheap-talk as in Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). However, it is equally unrealistic to postulate that politicians are completely
unbeholden to their promises.
We therefore propose a model in which campaign promises are neither completely bind-
ing nor complete cheap-talk, but nevertheless serve as a basis for the determination of final
policy outcomes. Once we allow the policy outcome to be different from the electoral plat-
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forms, an important question is how to define the policy outcome function, given electoral
platforms and voting decisions. For this purpose, we introduce a stage of policy bargaining
after the election. The benchmark is a one-dimensional spatial competition between two
policy-motivated parties1 (leftist vs. rightist) who are perfectly informed about the voter
distribution (Wittman (1977), Calvert (1985), Roemer (1994)). In a departure, we assume
that the losing party can obtain a policy concession from the winner at the bargaining stage
and that the amount of this concession increases with the loser’s vote share. One reason why
the latter has bargaining power is that he can delay the policy-making process, for instance,
by boycotting it in the legislature. More generally, we consider the loser as being able to
impose costs on the winner, proportional to his bargaining power or vote share, e.g. as in a
parliamentary system.
The bargaining outcome is given by a mapping from electoral platforms (and the implied
vote share for the loser) to final policy outcomes. We can employ Nash bargaining to define
this mapping.2 Here, the winner’s disagreement payoff is his utility at his own announced
platform minus some utility cost that is proportional to the loser’s vote share. The loser’s
disagreement payoff is his utility at the winner’s platform. The resulting solution gives the
final policy to be implemented by the winner. The final policy is to the left or to the right of
the (rightist or leftist, respectively) winner’s announced platform, depending on the identity
of the winner. Hence, the final policy is more favorable for the loser than the winner’s
platform, but it is bounded by the loser’s platform (i.e., the winner doesn’t need to give
more policy concessions than what is requested by the loser). Vote shares are determined
under the assumption that rational voters would correctly anticipate the final policy from
any given platforms and vote for the party whose (implemented) policy is closer to their ideal
positions. Political parties are also assumed to be rational in the sense that they understand
the implication of chosen platforms for vote shares and final policies.
An immediate consequence of our setup is non-convergence of equilibrium platforms. Our
model thus presents a case in which the median voter theorem fails to hold.3 The intuition
1We assume that the parties have single-peaked preferences over a given policy space and that the median
of voter distribution is located between two parties’ ideal positions.
2I also present later an axiomatic approach to policy outcome function which is an abstract version of
Nash bargaining.
3The median voter theorem still holds in our benchmark case of policy-motivated parties with commitment
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behind this result is simple. Suppose both parties announce the median in a campaign
stage. Since their electoral stance is the same, there is nothing to bargain and the policy
outcome remains to be the median. A policy-motivated party then finds it profitable to
deviate towards his ideal policy and get policy concession from the winner (the resulting
policy outcome is closer to his ideal position than is the median). Therefore, the possibility
of bargaining significantly mitigates the motivation to win (the motivation to move towards
the center) vis-a`-vis policy motivation (the motivation to go to the extreme).
Next, political parties are shown to announce extremely divergent platforms at any sym-
metric pure-strategy equilibrium.4 The losing party necessarily obtains a relatively large
amount of policy concession at any symmetric equilibrium. But then, each party can change
the policy outcome in his favor at any interior (symmetric) profile by deviating to a platform
that is slightly closer to his ideal position. Thus, interior profiles can never be best responses
and the parties will be located in the election at the boundary positions at which they no
longer have an incentive to deviate. However, the final policy outcome will be the median
no matter who wins the election at any pure-strategy equilibrium. Interestingly, De Sinopoli
and Iannantuoni (2007) also obtains a Duvergerian two-party equilibrium in which voters
vote only for the two extremist parties (or positions) in their model of multi-party election
with proportional representation system.
When the political environment doesn’t allow the loser to obtain sufficiently large pol-
icy concessions5, there may not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium due to a discontinuity in
parties’ payoffs. However, a mixed-strategy equilibrium can still be shown to exist in this
case. Since we have extreme divergence (in platforms) with large policy concession and
perfect convergence with no concession, it is natural to think that parties will mix over
platforms that lie between an extreme position and the median, with a relatively small but
still positive concession. We establish the existence of a mixed equilibrium with continuous
density strategies whose supports don’t intersect with each other. In other words, the leftist
to platforms.
4A symmetric profile is defined to be a pair of platforms at which both parties get equal vote shares. A
symmetry condition on the policy outcome function guarantees that both parties are equally distanced from
the median at any symmetric profile.
5If the losing party can’t get policy concessions, then we go back to our benchmark case where the final
policy is equal to the winner’s announced platform.
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(rightist) mixes over the policies to the left (right) of the median, and hence, the two parties
propose different policies in an election at any realization of mixed (equilibrium) strategies.
The main contribution of this chapter is an equilibrium analysis of platform choice game
with a simple post-electoral bargaining structure. There are only a few models that incor-
porate both election and legislative bargaining although we have fairly well-developed (and
separate) literature on both topics. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) is the earliest full equi-
librium model of both electoral and legislative process in a uni-dimensional policy space.
Baron and Diermeier (2001) extend it to a two-dimensional setting and provide a tractable
framework for studying such a wide range of topics as government formation, policy choice,
election outcomes and parliamentary representation. However, their focus is on the account
of multifarious aspects of government formation and less weight is put on the electoral choices
of politicians.6 De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni (2007, 2008) deliberately restrict their attention
on the strategic voting stage and analyze a subgame where all party positions are fixed. In
our model, the political parties are free to choose any platform in a given policy space and a
bargaining outcome is defined for each pair of chosen platforms. This enables us to analyze
the equilibrium effects of bargaining process on the electoral strategies of the parties.
The policy outcome function in our model is similar to that of De Sinopoli and Ian-
nantuoni (2007, 2008). Their outcome function is given by a linear combination of party
positions weighted with the share of votes that each party gets in the election. This compro-
mise outcome function is a model of multiparty proportional representation systems and as
such represents the bargaining outcome attained through the government formation process.
We employ the same modeling strategy and summarize post-electoral bargaining process in
a single outcome function, but we don’t go further to model the details of such process.7
The outcome function in our model can be derived as a Nash bargaining solution (Nash
6For example, bargaining in the Baron-Diermeier model takes place not over polices but over office-holding
benefits to attain the efficient outcome of coalition government (there’s a single efficient outcome for each
possible government) and the electoral stage only decides which government will in fact emerge.
7This approach contrasts with the one taken by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron and Diermeier
(2001) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) who all build up an explicit game of legislative bargaining after the
election. In particular, Baron and Diermeier (2001) derives the utilitarian solution of a bargaining process
among three parties with a quadratic loss utility in a two-dimensional setting. The outcome function of
De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni can be viewed as the Baron-Diermeier solution when the status quo is quite
negative for the elected politicians (De Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2007).
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1950) as mentioned before. Nash bargaining with specific parameters gives rise to the De
Sinopoli-Iannantuoni outcome function - the convex combination of party positions weighted
by vote shares - in our example.
As Ansolabehere (2006) puts it, “the problem (of non-convergence to the median) has
been perhaps the most fruitful for the development of a more robust economic theory of
elections.” The most well-known divergence result is that policy-motivated politicians do
not locate at the same policy position when they are imperfectly informed about voter
preferences (Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), Roemer (1994)). Incomplete information or
asymmetry in candidate characteristics often plays an important role in the recent theoretical
development of candidate divergence (Aragones and Palfrey (2002), Bernhardt, Duggan and
Squintani (2007, 2009a), Kartik and McAfee (2007), Callander (2008)).8 Notable exceptions
are Palfrey (1984) who derives a divergence result from the structure of political competition
with strategic entry and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) which is a well-known citizen candidate
model with non-binding campaign promises. Along a similar line, our divergence result is
motivated by a purely institutional reason. Platform divergence follows as a consequence of
the institutional structure of post-electoral bargaining.
In some sense, two-party competition may not be an adequate framework for post-
electoral politics involving government formation and policy bargaining. One may argue
that the outcome of two-party election is unambiguously given by the winner’s platform and
policy bargaining must be considered only under proportional systems with multi-party gov-
ernment formation. However, the US two-party presidential system is not free from policy
bargaining and compromise. Korean politics has also witnessed occasional mass demonstra-
tions against the military regimes in the late 70’s and 80’s which should have given the
opposing party a footing for the negotiation with the ruling party even if the latter is the
majority in the National Assembly. The Duvergerian extreme voting result of De Sinopoli
and Iannantuoni (2007) gives a theoretical justification for the analysis of policy bargaining
under two-party systems.
The chapter is organized as follows. The second section presents a model and an example
8For a broad categorization of the divergence results, see Ansolabehere (2006). The first footnote of
Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009b) gives a succinct and up-to-date summary of the theoretical models
that induce platform divergence.
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about Nash bargaining. The third section derives extreme platform divergence as a necessary
condition of the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. The fourth section shows the existence
of mixed-strategy equilibrium and explores the possibility of a mixed equilibrium with non-
overlapping supports. The fifth section concludes the chapter. The appendix at the back of
the dissertation contains the proofs of all results.
2.1 MODEL
2.1.1 Preliminaries
The policy space is given by a closed and bounded interval P = [a, b] of the real line.
Voters have single-peaked preferences and in particular they try to minimize the distance
of their ideal policies from whatever policy is finally implemented - the policy outcome can
be different from the electoral platforms, which is one of the main distinguishing features of
our model. We assume a continuum of voters (or a single representative voter) whose ideal
policies follow an atomless distribution F and F admits a density f which is strictly positive
on the policy space P . We denote by m the median of the voter distribution F .
There are two political parties, denoted by A and B, who also have single-peaked pref-
erences over P . In particular, we assume that both parties derive their preferences over the
policy outcome y according to utility representation vj(y), j = A,B. Each vj is assumed
to be single-peaked with ideal policy θj,
9 j = A,B, in the policy space which are strictly
different from the median and in conflict with each other in the sense that θA < m < θB.
We will further require vj(y) to be continuously differentiable in y in Section 4.2 where we
study “separating” mixed strategy equilibrium.
The game proceeds as follows. First, parties announce their electoral platforms p =
(pA, pB). Next, voters cast their ballots after observing the chosen platforms. We denote
the vote share for party j at p by αj(p), j = A,B. Obviously, αA(p) + αB(p) = 1 as we
don’t allow abstention. We sometimes drop the subscript for A’s vote share and express
9Single-peakedness implies each vj is strictly increasing on [a, θj ] and strictly decreasing on [θj , b].
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α(p) ≡ αA(p) so that αB(p) = 1 − α(p). The election is decided by majority rule, so
the winning party is the one who obtains a larger vote share. The final policy outcome
is determined through bargaining between winner and loser. The bargaining is based on
the electoral outcomes which can be summarized as {p, α(p)}.10 In particular, the loser’s
bargaining power comes from his vote share.
Even though the policy outcome can differ from the electoral platforms, a rational voter
who has knowledge about the entire voter distribution and the structure of policy bargaining
institutions can form correct expectations about who will win the election and what the
policy outcome will be just by observing the platforms announced by the parties. In this
way, we view the vote share as a function of observed platforms. We also assume rationality
of the political parties in the sense that they can predict voting behavior and the subsequent
bargaining outcomes at any electoral strategy profiles.
2.1.2 Example
In this example, we show how the bargaining process can be modeled and which platforms
will be chosen by the parties in an equilibrium of our electoral game with bargaining.
For simplicity, we assume the policy space is given by the unit interval P = [0, 1] and
voters’ ideal policies are distributed uniformly on P . Parties’ utilities are given by vj(y) =
−|y − θj| where y is the policy outcome and θA = 0, θB = 1. Voters decide whom to vote
for after observing the platforms (pA, pB) and policy bargaining ensues based on the chosen
platforms and the vote shares. In particular, each platform pair (pA, pB) induces a Nash
bargaining problem in the subsequent post-electoral stage with the winner’s disagreement
payoff being his utility at his own platform minus the cost to be imposed by the losing
party, vW (pW )− c(d(p), αL(p)), and the loser’s disagreement payoff being his utility at the
winner’s platform, vL(pW ).
11 In this way, the bargaining power of the opposing party is
modeled as a cost that he can impose in case the winner is not willing to bargain over policy
10In Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), the post-electoral legislative process is modeled as a noncooperative
bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature, and policy prediction is uniquely generated
by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties’ electoral policy positions.
11W denotes the winning party and L, the losing party. Since the winner is determined by vote shares,
and the vote shares are understood to change according to the platform p, we can more precisely express
winner and loser as W (p) and L(p), respectively.
9
Figure 1: Nash Bargaining Solutions.
but tries to implement his own platform. Here, the cost is assumed to depend on the distance
d(p)(≡ |pA − pB|) between platforms and the loser’s vote share αL(p).
Once the platforms (pA, pB) with pA < pB
12 are chosen, assuming party A wins, the
bargaining set is given by
S = {(vA, vB) : vA ≥ vA(pA)− c(d(p), αB(p)), vB ≥ vB(pA), vA + vB ≤ 1},
which is a compact and convex set and expressed as the shaded triangular region in Figure
1. S contains a point at which both parties are strictly better off than at their disagreement
payoffs. Therefore, this is a well-defined bargaining problem and the solution is found by
maximizing the product of the utility differences. Formally, the final policy y∗W , which will
12If pA ≥ pB , there’s nothing to bargain. We will come back to this later.
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depend on the identity of the winner at any given platform p, is obtained by solving the
following problem:
y∗W (p,α(p))
= argmax{ln[vW (y)− vW (pW ) + c(d(p), αL(p))] + ln[vL(y)− vL(pW )]}
s.t. pA ≤ y ≤ pB
vW (y) ≥ vW (pW )− c(d(p), αL(p))
vL(y) ≥ vL(pW )
The resulting outcome depends on who wins the election;
y∗A(p, α(p)) = pA +
1
2
c(d(p), αB(p))
y∗B(p, α(p)) = pB −
1
2
c(d(p), αA(p))
Specifying the form of cost as c = 2d(p)αj(p), we get y
∗
A = y
∗
B = α(p)pA+(1−α(p))pB.13
The vote share for A (voters vote for the party whose anticipated outcome is closer to their
ideal policies) is
α(p) =
1
2
(y∗A + y
∗
B) =
pB
1 + pB − pA ,
hence,
y∗A = y
∗
B =
pB
1 + pB − pA (= y
∗).
This specification leads to a unique pure-strategy equilibrium (pA, pB) = (0, 1) and y
∗
A =
y∗B =
1
2
(= y∗); i.e. the equilibrium platforms are as divergent as possible, but the policy
outcome is the median no matter who wins. Thus, our model in this example predicts
13This is precisely the De Sinopoli-Iannantuoni policy outcome with two parties, which is also their equi-
librium outcome. Thus, their outcome can be generated as a solution of the Nash bargaining problem -which
models post-electoral bargaining - with the disagreement payoffs reflecting the loser’s bargaining power.
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divergence in platforms and convergence in final policies, which will be generalized later in
a more abstract setting. The reason this is an equilibrium follows easily from the fact that
the policy outcome is strictly increasing in platforms ( ∂y
∗
∂pA
> 0 and ∂y
∗
∂pB
> 0), which implies
that both parties have incentives to always deviate toward their own ideal policies at any
interior platform profiles.
We finally note that there doesn’t exist a pure-strategy equilibrium with a cost of the
form c(d(p), αj(p)) = kd(p)αj(p) if 0 < k < 2, which prompts us to search for mixed
strategy equilibria (Section 4 will be devoted to the analysis of mixed equilibrium).
2.1.3 Abstract Bargaining Model
In general, the cost to be imposed by the opposing party is a function of the distance between
platforms d(p) ≡ max{pB − pA, 0}14 and that party’s vote share αj(p). However, instead of
cost functions taking specific forms, we consider a general class of the cost that satisfies the
following assumptions which capture the basic characteristics of post-electoral bargaining:
A1. c(0, αj) = 0 = c(d, 0) and c(d, αj) > 0 for (d, αj) 0.
A2. c(·, ·) is a C1 function with cd > 0 and cα > 0;
A3. c(d(p), αA(p)) + c(d(p), αB(p)) ≤ d(p), ∀p; and
A4. c(d(p), αi(p)) ≥ c(d(p), αj(p)) iff |pi −m| ≤ |pj −m| for i 6= j.
The first assumption says that the loser cannot impose costs if his vote share is zero or
if the two parties announce the same platforms (or A announces a platform that is closer to
B’s ideal policy in which case B may not need to impose further cost since A’s platform is
already favorable enough for him relative to his own platform); hence we formally define that
14Our main interest lies in the case where party A’s platform pA is below party B’s platform pB , as
the opposite case can easily be dismissed by strict dominance argument or by the fact that there’s simply
nothing to bargain. This is true especially when the median is in the middle of parties’ ideal policies and
the bargaining outcome is viewed as policy concession to be given by the winner. For completeness, we
define here in the abstract model the distance between platforms to be zero if pA ≥ pB so that the cost is
accordingly zero.
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the distance between platforms is zero in this case. However, as long as parties announce
distinct platforms in such a way that there is room for bargaining (i.e. pA < pB so that
the distance is positive) and their vote shares are positive, they have some bargaining power
represented as a positive cost. In view of our definition of the distance between platforms, it
is natural to assume that the cost is strictly increasing in the distance, and obviously, it must
be increasing in the vote share of the opposing party, which is the second assumption. The
third assumption guarantees that y∗A ≤ y∗B at any platform p with pA < pB since without this
assumption it is better for parties to lose a priori for some platforms, which is absurd. We
have a formal derivation of this in the following lemma. We finally assume that a party can
impose a larger cost if his platform is closer to the median. This assumption simplifies our
analysis because the task of determining a winner at any platforms becomes very cumbersome
without this. The reason is because vote shares are determined endogenously; i.e., given any
platforms, they are determined by the midpoint of the anticipated outcomes y∗A, y
∗
B which
depend crucially on the cost (and hence, vote shares) at the platforms, as is shown below.
Our model abstracts from any specific bargaining protocols and just assumes that, given
the electoral outcomes, p = (pA, pB) and (αA(p), αB(p)), the bargaining outcomes are given,
depending on the identity of the winner, by
y∗A(p) ≡ pA + c(d(p), αB(p))
y∗B(p) ≡ pB − c(d(p), αA(p))
As seen in Figure 2, when pA < pB, the bargaining outcome functions require the winner
to move from his own platform in a direction that is favorable to his opponent. The extent
of movement depends above all on the loser’s vote share which represents his bargaining
power. These are thus the simplest possible forms of the outcome functions under the policy
concession interpretation of post-electoral bargaining. We also note that these forms are
obviously motivated by the Nash bargaining solutions of our example.
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Figure 2: General Bargaining Outcomes.
For completeness, we also consider what the above definition implies about the bargaining
outcomes for pA ≥ pB. When pA ≥ pB, d(p) = 0 by definition and hence c(d(p), αj(p)) = 0
by assumption. Hence, if pA = pB,
y∗A(p, α(p)) = pA = pB = y
∗
B(p, α(p))
and if pA > pB,
y∗A(p, α(p)) = pA and y
∗
B(p, α(p)) = pB.
We collect a couple of immediate consequences of our assumptions about cost and bar-
gaining outcomes in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (1) If pA < pB, then pA < y
∗
A ≤ y∗B < pB.
(2) If |pi −m| < |pj −m|, then party i wins the election.
Voting behavior will be based not on the announced platforms but on the anticipation
of the above bargaining outcomes. That is, voters will vote for the party whose anticipated
outcome is closer to their ideal policies,15 which can be viewed as a version of “sincere voting”
15Voters thus vote over final policies, not over candidates, in our model, which according to Austen-Smith
and Banks (1988) is a correct specification of the choice set as what voters are ultimately interested in are
policy outcomes, not policy promises.
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under our modeling framework. Hence, with a continuum of voters, we determine the vote
share for each party as follows;
αA(p) ≡ F
(y∗A(p) + y∗B(p)
2
)
and αB(p) = 1− αA(p).
For any given platform p, party j wins if αj(p) is greater than a half (majority rule) and
ties are split evenly between the parties. The policy outcome y∗ to be implemented is the
winner’s outcome; hence y∗ = y∗j if αj >
1
2
, j = A,B, and y∗ is equally likely to be y∗A or y
∗
B
if αj =
1
2
.
2.2 PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
Following Nash, we define a pure strategy equilibrium as a platform pair (p∗A, p
∗
B) from
which neither party can find a unilaterally profitable deviation. One thing we should keep
in mind is that as a party changes his own platform, both bargaining outcomes y∗A, y
∗
B will
change accordingly because the outcomes depend on the vote shares which are functions of
both platforms. Since what ultimately matters is the final policy outcomes, it can be said
that party j’s deviation from his original platform changes in effect the opponent’s ultimate
position (y∗k) as well as his own (y
∗
j ).
We first note the following result that states non-convergence in equilibrium platforms.
Proposition 1. pA = pB can never be an electoral equilibrium; in particular, both parties
cannot choose the median with probability one in any equilibrium.
This result is immediate from our modeling setup. As shown in Figure 3, when both
parties locate at the median, it is better for party A to deviate toward his ideal policy since
then B will win but A can get a policy concession and hence is better off at B’s winning
policy outcome.
15
Figure 3: Non-convergence at equilibrium.
The parties in our model face two countervailing incentives of win motivation and utility
maximization. The former incentive drives them to converge to the median whereas the
latter one drives them in the opposite direction. When policy motivated political parties are
required to commit themselves to platforms, the win motivation is so strong that they must
converge to the median if voting behavior is deterministic; i.e. if the median is known with
certainty (Wittman 1977; Calvert 1985; Roemer 1994). In our model, even if voting behavior
is still deterministic, win motivation is substantially mitigated once we relax precommitment
to electoral platforms and allow the losing party to have some degree of bargaining power
over policy-making.
We next define a symmetric strategy profile as any pair (pA, pB) that satisfies
pA < m < pB and αA(p) = αB(p) =
1
2
But then, by the definition of vote shares and strict monotonicity of F , we have
y∗A+y
∗
B
2
= m,
which implies that pA+pB
2
= m. Thus we conclude that the distances of the platforms from
the median are the same at such a symmetric profile. Any other strategy profiles are defined
to be asymmetric.
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We also note that the only equilibrium candidates are the ones that satisfy pA < m < pB.
By Proposition 1, we can disregard the case where pA = pB. The case pA > pB can also be
easily dismissed; if m ≤ pB < pA, for example, then p˜A = pB − ε is a profitable deviation for
A. If m ≤ pA < pB, then m < y∗A ≤ y∗B, so p˜A = 2m − pB is a profitable deviation for A as
the parties will make a tie and the expected outcome is the median m at (p˜A, pB). The case
for pA < pB ≤ m is the same.
We need a couple of lemmas before we present the next main result that shows the
necessity of a sufficiently large cost and extreme divergence in platforms at any symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Both policy outcomes y∗A(pA, pB) and y
∗
B(pA, pB) are continuously differentiable
at any (pA, pB) with pA < pB.
We obtain this lemma by viewing the expressions for outcomes y∗A, y
∗
B as implicitly
defining these variables in terms of platforms pA, pB (note that the cost depends on the
vote share which is a function of y∗A, y
∗
B). We also get as a consequence of the Implicit
Function Theorem (IFT) the following lemma which is crucial in examining the profitability
of a deviation.
Lemma 3. At any symmetric strategy profile p = (pA, pB), party A’s vote share
αA(p) ≡ F
(
(y∗A+y
∗
B)(p)
2
)
is strictly increasing in pj, j = A,B.
With these two lemmas at hand, we are now ready to see what conditions necessarily
hold at any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (1) If (p¯A, p¯B) is a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, then
c(d(p¯),
1
2
) =
d(p¯)
2
.
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Figure 4: Necessity of large cost at pure equilibrium.
(2) Any interior symmetric profile cannot be a pure-strategy equilibrium; i.e. the only equi-
librium candidate is the pair (a, b) of boundary positions, given (a, b) is symmetric.
By A3, we must have c(d(p), 1
2
) ≤ d(p)
2
for all p, so (1) requires that the cost take its
maximum possible value at a symmetric equilibrium. We can interpret the relative magnitude
of cost as a characteristic of a particular post-electoral bargaining environment or political
system. Thus, it is possible that the opposing party has a relatively large bargaining power
with a given vote share if, for example, a political system is highly unstable and the winning
party doesn’t have full control over the military power of the polity to which it belongs.
But then, (2) requires that the parties announce their equilibrium platforms as extreme
as possible anticipating the substantial policy concession that they must yield as a winner.
Therefore, if each party’s ideal policy is located at the boundary of the policy space, then
announcing one’s ideal policy may be an equilibrium as is the case in our previous example.
This gives us an equilibrium support for the extremely differentiated campaign promises that
might be observed in reality.
In proving (1), we will use the fact that the stated condition on cost is equivalent to
y∗A(p¯) = y
∗
B(p¯) = m. Suppose the expected outcome (i.e., the midpoint of y
∗
A and y
∗
B)
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at a symmetric profile is the median, but nevertheless the outcome pertaining to A, for
example, is strictly below the median, as in Figure 4. Then, since Lemma 2 asserts that
the expected outcome and hence A’s vote share is increasing in A’s platform, A can win for
sure by announcing a platform slightly higher than his original platform while keeping his
own outcome (which changes continuously and now becomes the policy outcome) below the
median. In this way, A can find a profitable deviation.
We employ a similar argument to show the necessity of extreme divergence at any sym-
metric pure equilibrium. Figure 5 illustrates that any interior symmetric profile cannot be
an equilibrium. If (1) holds, then we can show that all the outcomes y∗j are increasing in
each platform at any symmetric profile. Therefore, A can, for example, announce a slightly
lower platform thereby making the winning outcome (y∗B) below the median, which shows A
can again find a profitable deviation.
The following is a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
that demands a large enough cost not only in symmetric but also in all possible strategy
profiles. The failure of the conditions in Proposition 2 would lead to a local deviation while
Figure 5: Incentive to diverge at interior symmetric profile.
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the conditions in Proposition 3 guarantees global optimality of the suggested profile.
Proposition 3. Suppose (a, b) is symmetric. Then, (a, b) is the unique symmetric equilib-
rium if
c(d(pA, b), αB(pA, b)) ≥ |pA −m|, ∀pA ∈ [a,m),
c(d(a, pB), αA(a, pB)) ≥ |pB −m|, ∀pB ∈ (m, b].
The following result shows that the policy outcome must converge to the median at any
pure equilibrium.
Proposition 4. In any pure-strategy equilibrium, the final policy outcome is located at the
median.
Up to now, we have focused on symmetric equilibrium. However, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of asymmetric equilibrium without further modeling assumptions. The above result
nevertheless shows that the median will be implemented in any (symmetric or asymmetric)
pure equilibrium.16
2.3 MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM
Our analysis of pure strategy equilibrium suggests that the opposing parties should be able
to impose a sufficiently large cost with a given vote share at any fixed equilibrium platforms.
However, there may exist political environments in which the losing party can impose only
16In Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), parties’ electoral platforms are symmetrically distributed about the
median voter’s ideal point, and the expected final policy outcome is at the median. However, the realized
final outcome lies between the median and either the rightmost or the leftmost party’s position, depending on
which party gets the largest vote share (the middle party always gets the second largest vote share). Since
our model involves two party competition, symmetric distribution of platforms always lead to the policy
outcome at the median. Our equilibrium condition implies that the policy outcome should be the median
even at any asymmetrically distributed profiles.
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a small cost. In other words, the losing party may have relatively small bargaining power
with any given vote share determined by the election. Thus, the relative magnitude of cost
characterizes political environments in terms of the bargaining power that the losing party
can derive from its vote share earned in the election.
Equilibrium analysis also depends on the relative magnitude of costs. The traditional
Downsian or Wittman model of spatial competition can be viewed as a limiting case of our
model where there exist discrete jumps in the cost that a party can impose as the vote share
changes.17 The traditional one-dimensional model can alternatively be specified as the one
in which
c(d(p), αj(p)) = d(p), if αj(p) >
1
2
;
=
d(p)
2
, if αj(p) =
1
2
;
= 0, if αj(p) <
1
2
.
Since the losing party whose vote share is less than a half can only impose zero costs, the
final policy will always be the winner’s platform and the equilibrium is in pure strategies by
which both parties choose the median.
Another extreme is the case where the losing party can impose a sufficiently large cost
so that we may have a pure strategy equilibrium. As we have seen before, the equilibrium
platforms in this case involve the extreme policies lying on the boundary of the policy space.
However, if the parties cannot impose sufficiently large costs but can impose positive costs
with any positive vote share, we no longer have a pure strategy equilibrium.18 Hence we
direct our search for equilibrium to those in which the parties mix over a range of platforms
between the median and the extreme policies.
17In our model, cost is assumed to vary continuously with vote shares.
18The policy outcome changes discontinuously at symmetric profiles where the winner changes, say, from
A to B, which subsequently brings about discontinuity in the parties’ payoffs.
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2.3.1 General Existence of Mixed Equilibrium
We first consider the general existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in our platform choice
game with bargaining. Suppose the pair (a, b) of boundary points is a symmetric profile and
c(d(p), 1
2
) < d(p)
2
, for all p ∈ P 2 = [a, b]2 such that αA(p) = αB(p) = 12 . By Proposition
2 (1), we don’t have a pure equilibrium in this case. The strategy space is given by SA =
SB = [a, b] = [θA, θB] ≡ P ; i.e. we assume that the ideal policies of the parties are located at
the boundary of the policy space. We redefine parties’ utilities wj(pA, pB) ≡ vj(y∗(pA, pB)),
j = A,B, as a function of platforms. When the cost is not sufficiently large, our game
becomes one with discontinuous payoffs, so we cannot apply the standard existence result of
Debreu-Fan-Glicksberg.19
We shall apply Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)’s existence theorem (Theorem 5b) for mixed
equilibrium.
Proposition 5. (Dasgupta and Maskin) Suppose (a, b) = (θA, θB) is symmetric and
c(d(p), 1
2
) < d(p)
2
, ∀p. Then, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the game
[(Sj, wj); j = A,B].
Theorem 5b (Dasgupta & Maskin) employs “compensating monotonicity” of both play-
ers’ payoffs to show existence; roughly speaking, it applies to situations where at any point in
which one player’s payoff falls, the other’s rises. Our game also shares this property once we
restrict the parties’ ideal policies to be located at the boundary (i.e. P = [a, b] = [θA, θB]).
20
We first characterize the points at which the parties’ utilities exhibit discontinuity.
19In particular, Glicksberg(1952) requires non-empty and compact strategy spaces and continuous utilities
for the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium.
20Alternatively, we can apply Dasgupta and Maskin’s main theorem (Theorem 5) to guarantee the exis-
tence. In this case, the “compensating monotonicity” condition is replaced by upper semi-continuity of the
sum of utilities, and weak lower semi-continuity of individual utilities. We can show the utility sum is upper
semi-continuous, for example, by additionally restricting parties’ utilities to be concave and symmetric in the
sense that vA(y) = vB(2m− y), ∀y ∈ P . Lower semi-continuity of individual utilities can be proved without
such restrictions. In this case, we can have the parties’ ideal policies in the interior of the policy space.
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Fix pA ∈ [a, b] and examine how party B’s utility vB(y∗(p)) changes as pB changes. We
fist consider a < pA < m. If pB approaches 2m − pA from the left, then pB is the winning
platform, so y∗B will be implemented. Hence,
lim
pB→(2m−pA)−
vB(y
∗(p)) = lim
pB→(2m−pA)−
vB(pB − c(pB − pA, αA)) = vB(mu)
where mu ≡ 2m− pA − c(2m− 2pA, 12).
On the other hand, if pB approaches 2m − pA from the right, y∗A is implemented along
the sequence, so
lim
pB→(2m−pA)+
vB(y
∗(p)) = lim
pB→(2m−pA)+
vB(pA + c(pB − pA, αB)) = vB(ml)
where ml ≡ pA + c(2m− 2pA, 12). Since c(2m− 2pA, 12) < m− pA by assumption,21 we have
mu > m > ml, implying
vB(mu) > vB(m) = vB(y
∗(pA, 2m− pA)) > vB(ml).
But then, vB is not continuous at pB = 2m− pA.
Similarly, if m < pA < b, then
lim
pB→(2m−pA)−
vB(y
∗(p)) = vB(pA) > vB(m)
> vB(2m− pA) = lim
pB→(2m−pA)+
vB(y
∗(p))
Hence, vB is discontinuous again at pB = 2m − pA. It can easily be seen that vB is
continuous at (pA, 2m− pA) if pA = m, a, or b (since (a, b) is symmetric, b = 2m− a). Also,
vB is continuous at (pA, pB) 6= (p, 2m− p).
We now formally state the assumptions of Dasgupta and Maskin (Theorem 5b);
1. Sj = P = [a, b] for j = A,B, is a closed interval.
21This follows from the assumption that c(d(p), 12 ) <
d(p)
2 .
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2. Each wj is continuous except on a subset S
∗∗(j) of S∗(j);
S∗(A) = {(pA, 2m− pA) : a ≤ pA ≤ b} = S∗(B),
S∗∗(A) = {(pA, 2m− pA) : a < pA < m, m < pA < b} = S∗∗(B).
3. Each |wj(pA, pB)| is bounded;22
|wj(pA, pB)| = |vj(y∗(p))| ≤ max{|vj(y∗A(p))|, |vj(y∗B(p))|}.
4. For each p ∈ (a,m) ∪ (m, b), wA and wB satisfy “compensating monotonicity”; i.e.
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wA(pA, pB) < wA(p, 2m− p)
< lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wA(pA, pB)
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wB(pA, pB) > wB(p, 2m− p)
> lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wB(pA, pB)
We only need to verify the last assumption since the other assumptions clearly hold by
the arguments up to now.
Lemma 4. Assumption 4 in Dasgupta and Maskin (Theorem 5b) about “compensating mono-
tonicity” is satisfied in our game [(Sj, wj); j = A,B].
Dasgupta and Maskin gives an existence proof in their Theorem 5b for the case where
the discontinuity occurs on the diagonal with a positive slope while the discontinuity in our
model takes place on the diagonal with a negative slope. However, the existence in our
case can be shown by a straightforward application of their proof which we reproduce in the
appendix.
The idea is to modify the payoffs at the points of discontinuity in such a way that
the game with modified payoffs satisfies the assumptions of Dasgupta and Maskin’s main
22y∗A(p), y
∗
B(p) lie in the compact interval [a, b] and vj is continuous.
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theorem (Theorem 5); i.e., upper semi-continuity of the sum of payoffs and weak lower semi-
continuity of individual payoffs. We then show that the equilibrium of the modified game is
also an equilibrium of the original game.
2.3.2 Separating Mixed Equilibrium
In this section, we try to understand what the equilibrium support would look like or what
kind of equilibrium support is admissible. Here, we focus on the possibility of separating
equilibrium with supports that don’t intersect or intersect with measure zero.
Thus, we are led to explore the existence of a mixed equilibrium with continuous density
strategies (gA, gB) that have the following features: (we assume in this section that each vj
is continuously differentiable.)
1. The supports of both equilibrium densities are symmetric around the median;
supp(gA) = [α, β], supp(gB) = [2m− β, 2m− α]
2. Both supports are separated or overlap with measure zero;
α < β ≤ m
If we can find a separating mixed equilibrium, then platform divergence in varying degrees
can be supported by a mixed equilibrium of the spatial model with post-electoral bargaining.
This would provide a rational foundation for the divergence of campaign promises in a world
where the parties’ private payoff perturbation is not perfectly observed and hence their plays
must be approximated by randomization over platforms.23
We begin with the condition that the parties must be indifferent between the platforms
in their equilibrium support so that their expected payoffs must be constant on the support,
23This is Harsanyi’s well-known “purification” interpretation of mixed strategy equilibrium.
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given the opponent’s equilibrium play.
VA(pA) =
∫ 2m−pA
2m−β
vA(y
∗
B(pA, pB))gB(pB)dpB
+
∫ 2m−α
2m−pA
vA(y
∗
A(pA, pB))gB(pB)dpB = kA,
∀pA ∈ [α, β]
(2.1)
VB(pB) =
∫ 2m−pB
α
vB(y
∗
B(pA, pB))gA(pA)dpA
+
∫ β
2m−pB
vB(y
∗
A(pA, pB))gA(pA)dpA = kB,
∀pB ∈ [2m− β, 2m− α]
(2.2)
where kA and kB are constants. Using Leibniz Rule, we differentiate the expected payoff of
party A with respect to his own platform to get a more tractable integral equations;
V ′A(pA) = [vA(y
∗
B(pA, 2m− pA))− vA(y∗A(pA, 2m− pA))]gB(2m− pA)
−
∫ 2m−pA
2m−β
v′A(y
∗
B(pA, pB))
∂y∗B
∂pA
(pA, pB)gB(pB)dpB
−
∫ 2m−α
2m−pA
v′A(y
∗
A(pA, pB))
∂y∗A
∂pA
(pA, pB)gB(pB)dpB
= 0
So, we obtain, for all pA ∈ [α, β],
gB(2m− pA)− λ(pA)−1
∫ 2m−pA
2m−β
v′A(y
∗
B(pA, pB))
∂y∗B
∂pA
(pA, pB)gB(pB)dpB
− λ(pA)−1
∫ 2m−α
2m−pA
v′A(y
∗
A(pA, pB))
∂y∗A
∂pA
(pA, pB)gB(pB)dpB = 0
where
λ(pA) ≡ vA(y∗B(pA, 2m− pA))− vA(y∗A(pA, 2m− pA)).
26
Our goal is to turn this equation to a standard Fredholm or Volterra integral equation
of the second kind.24 Since x(pA) = 2m− pA is invertible, we can define
v′A(yˆ
∗
B(x(pA), t))
∂yˆ∗B
∂pA
(x(pA), t)
≡ v′A(y∗B(x−1(x(pA)), t))
∂y∗B
∂pA
(x−1(x(pA)), t)
= v′A(y
∗
B(pA, t))
∂y∗B
∂pA
(pA, t);
v′A(yˆ
∗
A(x(pA), t))
∂yˆ∗A
∂pA
(x(pA), t)
≡ v′A(y∗A(x−1(x(pA)), t))
∂y∗A
∂pA
(x−1(x(pA)), t)
= v′A(y
∗
A(pA, t))
∂y∗A
∂pA
(pA, t); and
λˆ(x(pA)) ≡ λ(x−1(x(pA))) = λ(pA).
So, we finally get that, for all x ∈ [2m− β, 2m− α],
gB(x)− λˆ(x)−1
∫ x
2m−β
v′A(yˆ
∗
B(x, t))
∂yˆ∗B
∂pA
(x, t)gB(t)dt
− λˆ(x)−1
∫ 2m−α
x
v′A(yˆ
∗
A(x, t))
∂yˆ∗A
∂pA
(x, t)gB(t)dt = 0.
This is neither the Fredholm nor the Volterra equation in a standard sense, but is closer
to the former one with its kernel v′A(yˆ
∗(x, t)) ∂yˆ
∗
∂pA
(x, t) having a discontinuity at x. We can
still apply the Banach Fixed Point Theorem once λˆ(x) satisfies some condition that makes
24Fredholm integral equation of the second kind takes the form
x(t)− µ
∫ b
a
k(t, τ)x(τ)dτ = v(t),
where x is an unknown function on [a, b], µ is a parameter, and the kernel k and v are given functions on
[a, b]2 and [a, b], respectively. Volterra integral equation takes a similar form except for the upper limit of
the integral being variable.
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the integral operator a contraction mapping. Hence, there follows an existence result for the
indifference conditions (9) and (10).
Lemma 5. Suppose α < β ≤ m. We have a unique pair (gA, gB) of continuous functions
that satisfy the indifference conditions (9) and (10) if
ξ(β − α) < |vA(y∗B(pA, 2m− pA))− vA(y∗A(pA, 2m−pA))| ≡ |λ(pA)|,
∀pA ∈ [α, β]
ζ(β − α) < |vB(y∗B(2m− pB, pB))− vB(y∗A(2m− pB,pB))| ≡ |µ(pB)|,
∀pB ∈ [2m− β, 2m− α]
where ξ ≡ max{ξA, ξB}, ζ ≡ max{ζA, ζB},
ξj ≡ max
(pA,pB)∈Rj
∣∣∣v′A(y∗j (pA, pB)) ∂y∗j∂pA (pA, pB)
∣∣∣,
ζj ≡ max
(pA,pB)∈Rj
∣∣∣v′B(y∗j (pA, pB)) ∂y∗j∂pB (pA, pB)
∣∣∣, j = A,B
and RA ≡ {(pA, pB) : α ≤ pA ≤ β, 2m− pA ≤ pB ≤ 2m− α}
RB ≡ {(pA, pB) : α ≤ pA ≤ β, 2m− β ≤ pB ≤ 2m− pA}.
We note that Rj is the set of platform pairs at which party j wins. Also, both λ(pA) and
µ(pB) are determined in terms of our primitives vj(·) and c(·, ·) and strategies pA, pB since
y∗j is a function of platforms and cost:
y∗A(pA, 2m− pA) = pA + c(2m− 2pA,
1
2
)
y∗B(pA, 2m− pA) = 2m− pA − c(2m− 2pA,
1
2
)
y∗A(2m− pB, pB) = 2m− pB + c(2pB − 2m,
1
2
)
y∗B(2m− pB, pB) = pB − c(2pB − 2m,
1
2
)
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Thus, Lemma 5 characterizes the endogenous quantities α, β in terms of primitives. Specif-
ically, the sufficient condition requires that the length of the equilibrium support should be
no greater than the ratio of the utility differences at any symmetric profiles that can arise
by equilibrium play to the maximum possible rate of change in utilities with respect to the
change in platforms within the equilibrium support.
The following is an immediate observation from Lemma 5.
Proposition 6. If the equilibrium supports satisfy the sufficient conditions in Lemma 5,
then the equilibrium supports supp(gA) and supp(gB) don’t intersect; that is, β < m.
Proof. The sufficient condition must hold for pA = β in particular. If β = m, then
y∗B(m,m) = m = y
∗
A(m,m), implying λ(m) = 0 and hence β−α < 0, which is a contradiction.
2
Proposition 6 suggests a fairly strong divergence result for our mixed equilibrium. It says
that we can have a mixed equilibrium in which a platform that might be adopted by one
party in the equilibrium can never be announced as the campaign platform of its opponent.
The parties mix over some range of platforms below and above the median, respectively,
but the boundaries of those ranges must be strictly away from the median in an equilibrium
characterized by certain bounds on the length of the equilibrium supports.
2.3.3 Example
One immediate question is how restrictive are the sufficient conditions in Lemma 5. To get
an idea about this, we next consider the environment in our earlier example where the policy
space is given by the unit interval P = [0, 1], the voter distribution F is uniform on [0, 1]
and the parties’ utilities are linear vj(y) = −|y− θj| with θA = 0 and θB = 1 (we can in this
case represent without loss of generality the parties’ utilities as vA(y) = −y and vB(y) = y).
Suppose the cost is given by c(d(p), αj(p)) =
1
n
d(p)αj(p). Thus, this cost doesn’t
satisfy the necessary condition in Proposition 2(1) unless n = 1 (hence we don’t have a pure
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equilibrium for n ≥ 2) and indeed converges (uniformly) to zero as n tends to infinity. In
this case,
λ(pA) ≡ (1− 1
n
)(1− 2pA) ≥ (1− 1
n
)(1− 2β), ∀pA ∈ [α, β]
µ(pB) ≡ (1− 1
n
)(2pB − 1) ≥ (1− 1
n
)(1− 2β), ∀pA ∈ [1− β, 1− α]
Hence, the sufficient condition of Lemma 5 becomes
ξ(β − α) < (1− 1
n
)(1− 2β)
ζ(β − α) < (1− 1
n
)(1− 2β)
from which it is clear that we must have β < 1
2
.
We maximize the first partial derivatives of the outcome functions to obtain25
ξ = ξA =
∂y∗A
∂pA
(β, 1− β) = 1− 1
2n
− 1− 2β
2(n+ 1− 2β) ,
ζ = ζB =
∂y∗B
∂pB
(β, 1− β) = 1− 1
2n
− 1− 2β
2(n+ 1− 2β) .
Therefore, our sufficient condition is equivalent to
(
1− 1
2n
− 1− 2β
2(n+ 1− 2β)
)
(β − α) < (1− 1
n
)(1− 2β).
We can easily check that ξ (or ζ) is strictly greater than zero for all β ≥ 0. If we define
ψ(x) ≡ 1− 1
2n
− 1− 2x
2(n+ 1− 2x) ,
then,
25We can set up a standard constrained maximization problem and our calculation indicates that we have
corner solutions at (β, 1− β).
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ψ′(x) =
n
(n+ 1− 2x)2 > 0 and ψ(0) =
2n2 − 1
2n(n+ 1)
> 0.
We then consider a fixed sequence βn that increases to 1
2
; from the sufficient condition,
we know αn must be bounded below, for each n, by
βn − (1−
1
n
)(1− 2βn)
1− 1
2n
− 1−2βn
2(n+1−2βn)
→ 1
2
Here, the lower bound is strictly less than βn for all n, hence the sufficient condition can be
satisfied by letting αn close enough to βn. We also see that the lower bound converges to 1
2
.
That is, αn converges to the median for any given sequence βn increasing to the median and
thus we can say that the equilibrium support converges to the median along the sequence
(αn, βn) on which our sufficient condition is satisfied.
The final issue to be resolved is to ascertain that the solution established by Lemma
5 is indeed a density. It is in general not an easy task to show that the solution to our
integral equation exists as a density. We may proceed as in Meirowitz and Ramsay (2009) to
construct a density solution in a simple example. However, our integral equation is somewhat
more complicated than theirs, which prevents us from applying their method directly to our
example. The problem of whether a density solution exists can be formulated as finding a
solution function that satisfies the indifference conditions subject to the constraint that the
solution must be integrated up to one. The problem can alternatively be formulated as one
in which the constraint is given by our sufficient conditions and we must find a solution that
attains a maximum norm (which is 1 in our case).
2.4 SUMMARY
We have a relatively well established literature about the spatial theories of elections and
legislatures, but for the most part, theories of elections and theories of legislatures have de-
31
veloped independently of one another (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988). Therefore, studying
the electoral implications of legislative outcomes can be an important research topic, and
the game-theoretic literature on the topic is still in its inception. Even in two-party plural-
ity elections, there is good reason to doubt the assumption that the winner’s platform will
be implemented as the policy outcome. That assumption is at best an approximation to
the complicated post-electoral political process of policy-making as the opposing party can
employ various governmental and non-governmental institutions to keep the ruling party in
check.
This chapter thus extends the spatial model of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) in a
simple way to investigate the electoral stage and the subsequent policy-bargaining process
at the same time. We model the bargaining process with a single policy outcome function
that maps electoral platforms and vote results into a final policy outcome. Even if we don’t
consider an explicit noncooperative bargaining game to represent the post-electoral process,
we require the outcome function to satisfy a certain set of assumptions that capture the idea
that the losing party’s bargaining power varies with his share of votes and enables him to get a
policy compromise from the winner. Since the winner-takes-all scenario no longer holds in our
case, parties’ electoral incentives to converge to the center are substantially diminished and,
when the parties retain relatively large bargaining power as losers with a given vote share,
the equilibrium condition implies they must take extreme electoral positions, foreshadowing
the subsequent policy concession to be made in favor of potential losers. On the other hand,
if the amount of policy concession is not allowed to be sufficiently large under a political
system, the parties will have an incentive to mix over a range of platforms. A boundedness
condition on the length of equilibrium supports is sufficient to rationalize the mixed plays of
political parties, and necessarily entails separation between the equilibrium supports.
The policy outcome function that reflects the preferences of the parties with both ma-
jority and minority supports changes the electoral results in a way that is contrary to the
median voter theorem which is the single most important theoretical result in modern polit-
ical science and at the same time is false by most accounts (Ansolabehere 2006). It would
be interesting to study the various ways in which votes are translated into policies, which
amounts to an alternative specification of the policy outcome function. The resulting models
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may have richer implications for mass elections involving campaign advertisement, political
lobbying, information transmission through the media, etc.
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3.0 COMPULSORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY VOTING:
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Should voters be compelled to vote or should voting be voluntary? This question has been
hotly debated for some time and has yielded many compelling arguments for both positions
(see Birch (2009) for a history and review). Proponents of voluntary voting argue that the
right to vote implies a right not to vote, that compulsion is at odds with democracy and
may lead to inferior outcomes due to the inclusion of unwilling participants. Proponents of
compulsory voting argue that many activities are compelled in democracies, (e.g., the paying
of taxes, the completion of censuses) and that the larger turnout associated with compulsory
voting conveys a greater legitimacy upon electoral outcomes.
The question as to whether voting should be compulsory or voluntary is of real world
importance as both voting institutions coexist in nature. For instance, voting may be vol-
untary (abstention allowed) or compulsory in small committees or in jury deliberations. In
U.S. federal court for example, juror abstention in a criminal trial is not allowed and the
court can poll each juror about their vote after the verdict has been rendered (Rule 31, U.S.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). By contrast, juror abstention is allowed in certain
U.S. state courts, e.g., for civil court cases where unanimity is not required. There are
also differences in voting requirements for larger-scale, political elections. For instance, 29
countries, representing one-quarter of all democracies including Argentina, Australia and
Belgium, currently compel their citizens to vote (more accurately, to show up to vote) in
political elections (Birch 2009). Voluntary voting in political elections, as in the U.S., is the
more commonly observed voting mechanism.
One approach to evaluating voting mechanisms is to focus on their ability to aggregate
private information that is dispersed among the electorate. A standard assumption is that
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voters have common values, i.e., jury members wish to convict the guilty and acquit the
innocent, or voters wish to elect the most suitable candidate or party given the true state of
the world. In such an environment, the theoretical, rational-choice voting literature suggests
that if voting is compulsory, rational voters may have incentives to vote strategically, i.e.,
sometimes voting against their private information (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997, 1998; Myerson 1998). On the other hand, Krishna and
Morgan (2011, henceforth K-M) have recently shown that under a voluntary voting mech-
anism, sincere voting, (i.e., always voting in accordance with one’s private signal), can be
optimal when voters face private costs of voting and can freely choose whether to vote or to
abstain. While voting is sincere under the voluntary mechanism, participation decisions are
strategic and will depend on costs to voting (if there are such costs).1
Under the assumption of common values, theory suggests that voters will adapt their
behavior to the voting institution in place so that information aggregation is achieved and
social welfare is maximized under either compulsory or voluntary voting mechanisms. In
particular, if voting is costless, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1999a) show that for large
electorates, information aggregation is perfect under either voting mechanism. If voting
involves privately observed voting costs, K-M show, under certain conditions on the dis-
tribution of voting costs2 that information aggregation obtains for large electorates under
the voluntary voting institution. Moreover, for certain group sizes, they show that volun-
tary voting is better at information aggregation than is compulsory voting, however these
differences may be rather small and they disappear as the electorate gets large.
In essence, the debate over the merits of compulsory versus voluntary voting is one of
quantity versus quality of information contained in the vote tally. Under compulsory voting,
one obtains a high quantity of votes but if there is strategic voting, the quality may be
worse than under voluntary voting, where sincere voting is more likely, therefore making the
information of higher quality. If voting is costly, participation and therefore the quantity of
1Bo¨rgers (2004) compares compulsory versus voluntary voting under majority rule in a costly voting
model with private values; as noted earlier, we study a common values framework. Bo¨rgers argues that
voters ignore a negative externality generated by their own decision to vote: by voting they decrease the
likelihood that other voters are pivotal. Consequently there is over-participation when voting is voluntary;
making voting compulsory only serves to reduce welfare even further.
2Specifically, the lower bound for private voting costs is 0.
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information can depend on the distribution of voting costs so it is necessary to also consider
the case where voting is costly. Thus, the performance of each institution can depend on
how the costs of voting are distributed in the electorate. However, as long as there exists
individuals with zero costs of voting, K-M show that the welfare differences across voting
mechanisms vanish for a large enough electorate size.
The goal of this study is to experimentally explore whether the institution of voluntary
voting (the possibility of abstention) with or without voting costs does indeed suffice to
induce sincere voting behavior in laboratory voting games relative to the case of compulsory
voting, where insincere (strategic) voting is a possibility. We further explore the information
aggregation consequences of these voting mechanisms with the aim of understanding how
and why both compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms can coexist in nature.
A laboratory experiment has several important advantages over field research for ad-
dressing these questions. First, we can carefully control the information signals that sub-
jects receive prior to making their participation or voting decisions. Thus we can accurately
determine if voters are voting sincerely, i.e., according to their signals, or if they are voting
insincerely, i.e., against their signals. Second, we can carefully control and directly observe
voting costs which is more difficult to do in the field. Third, in the laboratory, we can imple-
ment the theoretical requirement that subjects have identical preferences (common values)
by inducing them to hold such preferences via the payoff function that determines their
monetary earnings.3 Finally, we note that all of our undergraduate subjects are voting-age
adults (18 years of age or older); by contrast with many other laboratory studies, our “stu-
dent subjects” may be regarded as “professional subjects” in that under U.S. law they are
eligible to serve on juries or to vote in elections.
The experimental environment we study involves an abstract group decision-making task.
All group members have identical preferences (the common value assumption) but each group
member gets a noisy private signal regarding the unknown, binary state of the world (e.g.,
guilt or innocence). This is the environment of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet
3Outside of the controlled conditions of the laboratory, preferences might differ greatly across voters; for
example, jury members might have differing “thresholds of doubt,” so that each requires a varying amount
of evidence before s/he could vote to convict. Such a scenario can be modeled as each voter incurring a
different magnitude of utility loss from an incorrect decision (as in Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998, 1999b).
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(1785)), which addresses the efficiency of various compulsory voting mechanisms in aggre-
gating decentralized information. Condorcet assumed that voters would vote sincerely, i.e.,
according to their private information. However the validity of that assumption was first
questioned by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). In particular, they showed that, if agents
are rational, the concern that an individual’s vote may be pivotal can outweigh the informa-
tion value of the signal he receives creating an incentive for the voter to vote strategically
against his private signal. Here we fix the voting rule – majority rule – while using the Con-
dorcet Jury environment to study the extent of sincere versus strategic voting when voter
participation is either voluntary or compulsory.
The compulsory voting mechanism we study involves no voting cost.4 Under our parame-
terization (discussed below) the unique compulsory voting equilibrium prediction is that one
signal type always votes sincerely, according to their signal, but that a significant fraction
(15.6%) of the other signal type votes against their signal. We refer to the latter behavior
as strategic or insincere voting. Under the voluntary mechanism, we consider both the case
where voting is costly and the case where there is no voting cost (costless). If voting is
voluntary and costly, then the unique symmetric equilibrium prediction is that voters vote
sincerely, conditional on choosing to vote (not abstaining). If voting is voluntary and costless,
then there exist two symmetric, informative equilibria. In the Pareto superior equilibrium,
conditional on choosing to vote, all voters vote sincerely (as in the voluntary but costly
voting case). The other, less efficient equilibrium under the voluntary but costless voting
mechanism is the same equilibrium that obtains under the compulsory mechanism; in this
equilibrium there is full participation by all voters but 15.6% of one signal type vote insin-
cerely against their signal, while the other signal type always votes sincerely. Thus under the
voluntary but costless voting mechanism there is an interesting equilibrium selection issue
that our experiment can address.
We further examine equilibrium predictions regarding participation rates under the two
voluntary voting mechanisms. Under voluntary and costless voting, the participation rate
of one signal type is predicted to be 54% while the participation rate for the other signal
4One could add a voting cost to the compulsory voting mechanism but since voting is compulsory, the
addition of such a cost would not change the equilibrium prediction in any way.
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type is predicted to be 100%; these type specific participation rates fall significantly to just
27% and 55%, respectively, under the voluntary but costly voting mechanism. Thus our
design enables us to test the effects of voting mechanisms on the two important strategic
dimensions (voting and participation) of the theory.
Finally, we also assess the efficiency of the groups in making collective decisions, in
particular we ask to what extent groups reach the correct decision. For our parameterization
of the model, the theory suggests that the voluntary but costless voting mechanism is the
most efficient (accurate) followed by the compulsory mechanism and then by the voluntary
but costly mechanism.
We report the following experimental findings. First, consistent with theoretical predic-
tions, there is significantly more strategic voting under the compulsory voting mechanism
than under either of the two voluntary voting mechanisms; under the latter two mechanisms,
nearly all subjects are voting sincerely. Second, under the two voluntary voting mechanisms,
there is over-participation in voting relative to theoretical predictions. However, the compar-
ative static predictions of the theory find strong support in our data; in particular, consistent
with the theory, participation rates are higher when voting is costless than when it is costly,
and participation rates are always higher for one signal type than for the other. Finally,
under both compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms, groups achieve the correct out-
come between 85 and 90 percent of the time and the ranking of the three mechanisms in
terms of the accuracy of group decisions is in line with theoretical predictions. Still, the
theoretical efficiency differences across the three mechanisms are small (under our param-
eterization of the model) and indeed, the observed differences in informational efficiency
across the three voting mechanisms in our experimental data are not statistically significant
from one another. Taken together, our findings suggest that individuals do adapt their be-
havior to the particular voting institution that is in place and thus provide an answer to the
question posed at the beginning of the chapter as to why compulsory and voluntary voting
mechanisms coexist in nature.
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3.1 RELATED LITERATURE
Palfrey (2009) provides an up–to–date survey of experimental studies of voting behavior.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) is the earliest experimental study reporting
evidence of strategic voting in the context of the same Condorcet jury model. Under the
unanimity rule, a large percentage (between 30% and 50%) of subjects were observed voting
against their signals, which is largely consistent with the equilibrium predictions of Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998) for the model parameterization studied. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey
and Palfrey (2000) also study behavior under a majority voting rule as we do in this chapter,
but under their parameterization of the model, under majority rule, voters should always
vote sincerely. By contrast, in the compulsory voting majority rule set-up that we study, the
equilibrium prediction calls for some insincere voting.
Goeree and Yariv (2011) also report on an experiment using the Condorcet jury model
where subjects are compelled to vote but where various voting rules are considered, prefer-
ences are varied so that jurors do not always have a common interest and most significantly,
subjects are able to freely communicate with one another prior to voting. They report that
absent communication, there is evidence that subjects vote strategically in accordance with
equilibrium predictions under various voting rules, but that these institutional differences
are diminished and efficiency is increased when subjects can communicate (deliberate) prior
to voting. As with our study, the work of Goeree and Yariv provides further evidence that
voters adapt their behavior to institutions, in this case, through the use of communication.
Importantly, neither Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000) nor Goeree and Yariv
(2011) allow for abstention– they only study a compulsory and costless voting mechanism.
If instead we allow voters to make participation decisions which can either be costless or
costly prior to making their voting decisions as in K-M (2011), we can change the incentive
structure of strategic voting decisions in such a way that sincere voting in the Condorcet
Jury model no longer contradicts rationality.
A second, related experimental voting literature studies the team participation game
model of voter turnout due to Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985); see, e.g., Schram and
Sonnemans (1996), Cason and Mui (2005), Großer and Schram (2006), Levine and Palfrey
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(2007) and Duffy and Tavits (2008). In this voluntary and costly voting game, two teams
of players compete to win an election; for instance under majority rule, the team with the
most votes wins. Experimental studies of this environment have typically involved no private
information and have supposed that voters faced homogeneous costs to voting (abstention is
free). Levine and Palfrey (2007) have designed experiments with heterogeneous voting costs
to test several of the comparative statics predictions of the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)
model. By contrast, the Condorcet jury environment that we study does not involve team
competition, but does have private information (regarding the true state of the world) and
we adopt Levine and Palfrey’s (2007) design of having heterogeneous voting costs in our
voluntary but costly voting treatment. Further, we are making the important comparison
between the voluntary voting mechanism of the team participation game set-up and the
compulsory voting mechanism that is more typically used in the Condorcet jury model.
Thus, this chapter provides an important bridge between these two approaches.
Finally, we note that Battaglini et al. (2010) have recently reported on an experimental
test of the “swing voter’s curse” theory proposed by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). They
study the effects of asymmetric information on voter participation under a voluntary and
costless voting mechanism; the swing voters are either informed or uninformed, and some
fraction of the uninformed voters participate in voting to counterbalance votes by “partisans’
while the remaining fraction of swing voters abstain so as to delegate their decisions to
the informed.5 We study a common interest situation with symmetric information, where
abstention under the voluntary voting mechanism arises due to asymmetry in the precision
of signals (and in part due to voting cost under the voluntary and costly voting mechanism),
which has a direct impact on strategic voting behavior.
5The presence of partisans (whose preferences don’t depend on the state) introduces a conflict of interest.
By contrast, we study a common values setup where there is no conflict of interest after the state is realized.
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3.2 MODEL
The experiments are based on the standard Condorcet Jury setup. We consider three dif-
ferent voting mechanisms: 1) compulsory and costless voting (C); 2) voluntary and costless
voting (VN); 3) voluntary and costly voting (VC). In all three cases a group consisting of
an odd number N of individuals faces a choice between two alternatives, labeled R (Red)
and B (Blue). The group’s choice is made in an election decided by simple majority rule.
There are two equally likely states of nature, ρ and β. Alternative R is the better choice in
state ρ while alternative B is the better choice in state β. Specifically, in state ρ each group
member earns a payoff of M(> 0) if R is the alternative chosen by the group and 0 if B is
the chosen alternative. In state β the payoffs from R and B are reversed. Formally, we have
U(R|ρ) = U(B|β) = M,
U(R|β) = U(B|ρ) = 0.
Prior to the voting decision, each individual receives a private signal regarding the true state
of nature. The signal can take one of two values, r or b. The probability of receiving a
particular signal depends on the true state of nature. Specifically, each subject receives a
conditionally independent signal where
Pr[r|ρ] = xρ and Pr[b|β] = xβ.
We suppose that both xρ and xβ are greater than
1
2
but less than 1 so that the signals
are informative but noisy. Thus, the signal r is associated with state ρ while the signal
b is associated with state β (we may say r is the correct signal in state ρ while b is the
correct signal in state β). We shall assume that xρ > xβ, i.e., that the correct signal is more
accurate in state ρ than in state β. This assumption is required for there to be some insincere
voting under the compulsory voting mechanism and it yields sufficiently large differences in
equilibrium predictions across the three voting mechanisms, facilitating our ability to identify
such differences in the (possibly noisy) experimental data.
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The posterior probabilities of the states after signals have been received are:
q(ρ|r) = xρ
xρ + (1− xβ) and q(β|b) =
xβ
xβ + (1− xρ) .
Since xρ > xβ, we have q(ρ|r) < q(β|b). Thus, b is a stronger signal in favor of state β than
r is in favor of state ρ. The latter is a critical inference that individuals must make if they
are to make rational voting decisions.
Having specified the preferences and information structure of the model, we discuss in
the next three subsections, the strategies, equilibrium conditions and equilibrium predictions
for each of the three voting mechanisms that we explore in our experiment. We restrict
attention to symmetric equilibria in weakly undominated strategies, as these are the most
relevant equilibrium predictions given the information that was available to subjects in our
experiment.6 In particular, we require that in equilibrium (i) all voters of the same signal
type play the same strategies and (ii) no voter uses a weakly dominated strategy. In what
follows we only discuss the equilibrium predictions and the conditions under which they are
valid; a derivation of theses solutions is presented in the Appendix.
3.2.1 Compulsory Voting
When voting is compulsory, the strategy of a voter is a specification of two probabilities
{vr, vb} where vr is the probability of voting for alternative R given an r signal and vb is the
probability of voting for alternative B given a b signal (that is, vs is the probability of voting
according to one’s signal s, or voting sincerely). Under the compulsory voting mechanism,
there exists a unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. In this equilibrium for a
large set of parameter values (including those of our experimental design) voters with signal
b (i.e., signal type-b) always vote for B (i.e., v∗b = 1) while those with signal r (i.e., signal
type-r) mix between the two alternatives (i.e., v∗r ∈ (0, 1)).
6 There always exists an uninformative equilibrium in which everyone ignores their signal and votes for
a fixed alternative. However, this kind of equilibrium involves the play of weakly dominated strategies, and
for this reason we exclude consideration of such equilibria from our analysis.
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Such mixing requires that the voter obtaining signal r be indifferent between voting for
R or B conditioning on a tie vote (given play of equilibrium strategies by the other players),
which gives the following equilibrium condition
U(R|r)− U(B|r) ≡M{q(ρ|r) Pr[Piv|ρ]− q(β|r) Pr[Piv|β]} = 0,
where U(A|s) is the payoff that a voter gets when alternative A ∈ {R,B} is chosen and her
signal (type) is s ∈ {r, b}; and Pr[Piv|ω] is the probability that a vote is pivotal at state
ω ∈ {ρ, β}. Since voting is compulsory and N is chosen to be an odd number, a vote is
pivotal only when exactly half of the other N − 1 voters have voted for R and the other
half have voted for B. Since the pivot probabilities depend on vr, the above indifference
condition determines v∗r . Moreover, given this value for v
∗
r and the fact that type-b voters
strictly prefer to vote sincerely in equilibrium, we must have
U(B|b)− U(R|b) ≡M{q(β|b) Pr[Piv|β]− q(ρ|b) Pr[Piv|ρ]} > 0.
The intuition for why type-b voters vote sincerely and type-r voters mix is as follows. If
everyone votes her signal, the event where there is a tie vote among the other N − 1 voters
implies that there are an equal number of r and b signals. Since signals are less accurate
in state β (i.e. xρ > xβ), an equal number of r and b signals is more likely to occur in
state β than in state ρ. Conditioning on pivotality, the likelihood of state β is large enough
that it swamps the information about states contained in the private signal, and the best
response to a strategy profile with sincere voting is to vote for B irrespective of the signal.
If, on the other hand, some type-r voters vote against their signals while all type-b voters
vote sincerely, an equal number of votes for R and B implies a larger number of r signals
than b signals: in particular, the information contained in the pivotal event is not strong
enough to make the private signal irrelevant. In fact, the mixing probability is chosen in
such a way that a private signal of r leads to the posterior likelihood of the two states being
equal (conditioning on pivotality), thereby preserving the incentive to mix on obtaining an
r signal. Clearly, a b signal leads to an inference of state β being more likely than state ρ in
the event of a tie, and so the best response for a type-b voter is therefore to always vote for
B (i.e., to always vote sincerely).
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3.2.2 Voluntary and Costless Voting
When voting is voluntary, the action space includes three choices: a vote for R, a vote for B,
or abstention, which we denote by φ. Thus, a voter’s (mixed) strategy is a mapping from the
signal type space {r, b} to the set of all probability distributions over {R,B, φ}. This set-up
is exactly the same as that in K-M except that we have a fixed number, N , of voters (as this
is easier to explain to subjects) while in K-M the number of voters is randomly drawn from a
Poisson distribution.7 In the K-M setting, all equilibria entail sincere voting: conditional on
voting, type-b voters vote B and type-r voters vote R (K-M Theorem 1). This result does
not automatically generalize to a set-up with fixed N ; for arbitrary values of N there may
be other kinds of equilibrium. Indeed, for any N , the unique symmetric equilibrium of the
compulsory voting model, where there is full participation (no abstention) and type-b voters
always vote sincerely while type-r voters mix with probability v∗r ∈ (0, 1), will also be an
equilibrium under the voluntary and costless voting mechanism. Once we make voluntary
voting costly, the latter insincere voting equilibrium disappears under the voluntary voting
mechanism and, as discussed in the next section, we will have a unique symmetric sincere
voting equilibrium.8 To be consistent with K-M, we focus our attention in this section on
the sincere voting equilibrium.
Given the restriction to sincere voting, the strategy of a voter simplifies to two participa-
tion rates {pr, pb}, one for each signal type. In this case full participation (i.e., pr = pb = 1)
cannot be an equilibrium for the same reason that sincere voting is not an equilibrium under
the compulsory voting mechanism. In fact, following Lemma 1 in K-M, we can show that
under voluntary and costless voting, pb > pr in any equilibrium with sincere voting
9. In our
discussion of the unique symmetric equilibrium under compulsory voting, we observed that,
in order to preserve the incentive for informative voting, the event where there is a tied vote
among the other N − 1 players (i.e., equal number of votes for R and B) must indicate a
signal profile where there are more r signals than b signals. Under sincere voting, this is
7K-M show that any difference between these two approaches disappears when the group size, N , is
sufficiently large.
8A proof of the existence of two symmetric informative equilibria under the voluntary and costless voting
mechanism is available on request.
9The statement and proof of Lemma 1 in K-M can be shown to apply to the fixed N environment that
we study with only minor modifications.
44
achieved only if type-b voters vote with a higher probability than type-r voters. Therefore,
while the compulsory voting mechanism addresses the pivotality concern by having type-r
voters sometimes vote against their signal, under the voluntary voting mechanism the same
concern is addressed by having type-r voters abstain from voting with a higher probability.
In the case with costless voting, in the equilibrium that involves sincere voting, we should
have p∗b = 1 and p
∗
r ∈ (0, 1), i.e., type-b voters always participate and vote for B while type-r
voters mix between abstaining and voting for R. The participation rate for type-r voters
is determined by making the type-r voter indifferent between voting for R and abstaining,
specifically by setting
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) ≡M{q(ρ|r) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|r) Pr[PivR|β]} = 0,
where Pr[PivR|ρ] denotes, for example, the probability that a vote for R is pivotal in state
ρ and this pivot probability is a function of the participation rate pr of type-r.
10 Under
our parameter specification, the above indifference condition identifies a unique value of p∗r.
Moreover, given p∗r, since the type-b voter strictly prefers to vote for B rather than abstain,
we must have that
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) ≡M{q(β|b) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|b) Pr[PivB|ρ]} > 0.
Additionally, sincere voting by type-r voters requires that given equilibrium participation
rates we must have
U(R|r)− U(B|r) ≥ 0
⇔ U(R|r)− U(φ|r) ≥ U(B|r)− U(φ|r)
⇔ q(ρ|r) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|r) Pr[PivR|β] ≥ q(β|r) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|r) Pr[PivB|ρ],
10Since we allow abstention under the voluntary voting mechanisms, a vote can either make or break a
tie. If we denote by T , T−1, and T+1 the events that the number of votes for R is the same as, one less than,
and one more than the number of votes for B, respectively, then for each ω ∈ {ρ, β},
Pr[PivR|ω] = Pr[T |ω] + Pr[T−1|ω] and Pr[PivB |ω] = Pr[T |ω] + Pr[T+1|ω],
where the pivot probabilities depend on the participation rate pr.
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and similarly, sincere voting by type-b voters requires that
U(B|b)− U(R|b) ≥ 0
⇔ q(β|b) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|b) Pr[PivB|ρ] ≥ q(ρ|b) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|b) Pr[PivR|β].
These two conditions require that voting sincerely be incentive compatible. We check (in
the Appendix) that both conditions hold given our solutions for p∗r and p
∗
b .
3.2.3 Voluntary and Costly Voting
Under the voluntary but costly voting mechanism, each voter faces a cost c to voting, so
that his overall utility is U(A|ω)−c if he votes and U(A|ω) if he abstains, where A ∈ {R,B}
is the winning alternative and ω ∈ {ρ, β} is the state. The voting cost is a random variable
drawn independently across individuals from a set C = [0, c], c > 0, according to an atomless
distribution, F . We further assume that voting costs are drawn independently of signals.
After observing their voting cost and signal, voters then decide whether to vote or to abstain.
Thus, in this setting a player type consists of both a signal and a cost of voting. Generally,
the (mixed) strategy of a voter is a mapping from the type space {r, b} × C to the space of
probability distributions over {R,B, φ}. In order to replicate the results in K-M, we again
restrict attention to equilibria with sincere voting, however, under certain conditions (that
are satisfied by the parameters chosen in our experimental design), it can be shown that
under costly, voluntary voting the insincere voting equilibrium of the compulsory voting
mechanism can no longer be an equilibrium, and indeed, the unique symmetric equilibrium
will involve sincere voting by all player types.11 Therefore, the choice faced by each voter
under the voluntary and costly voting mechanism is whether to vote sincerely or to abstain.
If voting is costly, then there exists a positive threshold cost, c∗s, for each signal s ∈ {r, b}
such that an agent whose signal is s votes only if her realized cost is below the threshold c∗s.
The equilibrium participation rate for each signal, p∗s = F (c
∗
s), s ∈ {r, b}, are determined by
11We have verified that this is the case; a proof is available upon request.
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the cost threshold at which a voter with signal s is indifferent between voting sincerely and
abstaining, specifically
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) ≡ M{q(ρ|r) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|r) Pr[PivR|β]} = F−1(pr),
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) ≡ M{q(β|b) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|b) Pr[PivB|ρ]} = F−1(pb).
These two equations require that the expected benefit from sincere voting must equal the
realized costs for the cutoff cost types, c∗s, given that all other voters adopt the same cutoff
costs for participating in voting and that all those choosing to participate, also choose to
vote sincerely. Here, the pivot probabilities are again functions of both types’ participation
rates (pr, pb).
The two equations above identity the equilibrium participation rates {p∗r, p∗b} simulta-
neously (and uniquely for our parameter values and uniform cost distribution over C). By
the same logic used for the voluntary and costless voting mechanism, we must have p∗b > p
∗
r
to preserve the incentives for informative voting. In other words, we must have c∗b > c
∗
r.
Furthermore, given the equilibrium participation rates, each participating voter must prefer
to vote sincerely. Therefore, just as in the case with costless voluntary voting, we must have
U(R|r)− c ≥ U(B|r)− c
⇔ q(ρ|r) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|r) Pr[PivR|β] ≥ q(β|r) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|r) Pr[PivB|ρ]
U(B|b)− c ≥ U(R|b)− c
⇔ q(β|b) Pr[PivB|β]− q(ρ|b) Pr[PivB|ρ] ≥ q(ρ|b) Pr[PivR|ρ]− q(β|b) Pr[PivR|β].
We can again show (in the Appendix) that both of these inequalities hold given our solutions
for p∗r and p
∗
b .
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3.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We consider two treatment variables: 1) the voting mechanism, compulsory or voluntary,
and within the voluntary treatment alone we further consider 2) whether voting is costless
or costly. We adopt a between subjects design so that in each session subjects only make de-
cisions under one set of treatment conditions. Across the three treatments of our experiment
all parameters of the voting model and all other dimensions of the experimental design, e.g.,
the group size, the number of repetitions, the history of play, the payoff function, etc., are
held constant.
The experiment was presented to subjects as an abstract group decision–making task us-
ing neutral language that avoided any direct reference to voting, elections, jury deliberation,
etc. so as not to trigger other (non-theoretical) motivations for voting (e.g., civic duty, the
sanction of peers, etc.).
Each session consists of a group of 18 inexperienced subjects and 20 rounds. At the
start of each round, the 18 subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups of N = 9
subjects. One group is assigned to the red jar (state ρ) and the other group is assigned to
the blue jar (state β) with equal probability, thus fixing the true state of nature for each
group. No subject knows which group they have been assigned to and group assignments are
determined randomly at the start of each new round so as to avoid possible repeated game
dynamics. Subjects do know that it is equally likely that their group is assigned to the red
jar or to the blue jar at the start of each round.
The red jar contained fraction xρ red balls (signal r) and fraction 1−xρ blue balls (signal
b) while the blue jar contained fraction xβ blue balls and fraction 1− xβ red balls. We fixed
the probabilities, xρ and xβ, at 0.9 and 0.6, respectively, across all sessions of our experiment,
and these signal precisions were made public knowledge in the written instructions, which
were also read aloud at the start of each session.12 We chose values for xρ and xβ that
provided stark differences in equilibrium predictions across our three treatments with the aim
of facilitating identification of any treatment differences in the (possibly noisy) experimental
data.
12A sample of the written instructions used in the experiment is provided in the Appendix.
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The sequence of play in a round was as follows. First, each subject blindly and simul-
taneously draws a ball (with replacement) from her group’s (randomly assigned) jar. This
is done virtually in our computerized experiment; subjects click on one of 10 balls on their
decision screen and the color of their chosen ball is revealed.13 While the subject observes
the color of the ball she has drawn, she does not observe the color of any other subject’s
selections or the color of the jar from which she has drawn a ball. A group’s common and
publicly known objective is to correctly determine the jar, “red” or “blue”, that has been
assigned to their group.
In the two treatments without voting costs, after subjects have drawn a ball (signal) and
observed its color, they next make a voting decision. In the compulsory voting treatment
(C), they must make a “choice” (i.e., vote) between “red” or “blue”, with the understanding
that their group’s decision, either red or blue, will correspond to that of the majority of
the 9 group members’ choices and that the group aim is to correctly assess the jar (red or
blue) that was assigned to the group. In the voluntary but costless voting treatment (VN),
the only difference from the compulsory treatment is that subjects must make a “choice”
between “red”, “blue” or “no choice” (abstention). The group’s decision in this case, “red”
or “blue,” will correspond to that of the majority of the group members who made a choice
between “red” or “blue” i.e., who participated in voting. In the voluntary treatments (but
not in the compulsory treatment) there is the possibility of ties in the voting outcome, i.e.,
equal numbers of votes for red and blue (including also the possibility that no one chooses
to vote). In the event of a tie, the group’s decision is labeled “indeterminate”, otherwise
it is labeled “red” or “blue” according to the majority choice of those who participated in
voting.
In the voluntary but costly voting treatment (VC), after each subject i has drawn a ball,
each gets a private draw of their cost of voting for that round, ci, that is revealed to them
before they face a voting/participation decision. After observing both the color of the ball
drawn and the cost of voting, each group member privately votes for either the red jar or
the blue jar or chooses to abstain (“no choice”) as in the case where voting is voluntary and
13For each round and for each subject, the assignment of colors to the 10 ball choices the subject faced
was made randomly according to whether the jar the subject was drawing from was the red jar (in which
case percentage xρ of the balls were red) or the blue jar (in which case percentage xβ balls were blue).
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costless. The group’s decision is again made by majority rule among all group members who
do not abstain and the color chosen by the majority is the group’s decision. A tie is again
regarded as an “indeterminate” outcome.
Payoffs each round are determined as follows. If the group’s decision via majority rule
is correct, i.e., the group’s decision is red (blue) and the jar assigned to that group was in
fact red (blue), then each of N = 9 members of a group, even those who abstained in the
two voluntary voting treatments, receive 100 points (M = 100). If the group’s decision is
incorrect, then each of the 9 members of the group receive 0 points. If the group’s decision
is “indeterminate” i.e., there is a tied vote for “red” or “blue”, then each of the 9 members
of the group receive 50 points. This payoff function is the same across all three treatments.
In the voluntary and costly voting (VC) treatment only, the cost of voting is implemented
using an “NC-bonus” payment where “NC” stands for “no choice”. Thus, in the VC treat-
ment, subject i gets 100 + ci points if she abstains and her group decision is correct while
she gets ci points if she abstains but the group’s decision is incorrect and 50 + ci points if
she abstains and the group’s decision is indeterminate. A decision by subject i to vote in a
round of the VC treatment means that she loses the NC-bonus for that round, receiving a
payoff of either 100, 0 or 50 depending on whether the group’s decision is correct, incorrect
or indeterminate, respectively. Subjects are informed that the NC-bonus for each round (ci)
is an i.i.d. uniform random draw from the set {0, 1, ..., 10}14 for each subject i and applies
only to that round.15
Following 20 rounds of play, the session was over. Subjects’ point totals from all 20
rounds of play were converted into dollars at the fixed and known rate of 1 point = $0.01
and these dollar earnings were then paid to the subjects in cash. In addition, subjects were
given a $5 cash show–up payment. Thus, it was possible for each member of each group (red
or blue) to earn up to $1 in each of the 20 rounds of play and in the VC treatment only,
subjects could earn or forego an additional NC bonus of up to $0.10 per round. Average
earnings for this 1-hour experiment (including the $5 show-up payment) were $22.51.
14The upper bound for ci could have been set higher, up to 100, but we chose a low value to encourage
voter participation.
15Our implementation of voting cost follows that of Levine and Palfrey (2007) and has the nature of an
opportunity cost.
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Session No. of subjects No. of rounds Voting Voting
Numbers per session per session Mechanism Costly?
C1-4 18 20 compulsory no
VN1-4 18 20 voluntary no
VC1-4 18 20 voluntary yes
Table 1: The Experimental Design
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design, which involved four sessions of each of our
three treatments. As we have 18 subjects per session, we have collected data from a total of
4×3×18 = 216 subjects. Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of the
University of Pittsburgh and the experiment was conducted in the Pittsburgh Experimental
Economics Laboratory. No subject participated in more than one session of this experiment.
3.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
We first consider the equilibrium predictions for the compulsory voting mechanism (C). For
our parameter values, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies in which subjects with signal b always vote for Blue (vote sincerely) while those
with signal r vote against their signal (vote for Blue) with strictly positive probability (i.e.,
there is some insincere or strategic voting). More precisely under our parameterization,
voters receiving the red (r) signal are predicted to play a mixed strategy where they vote
against their r-signal (they vote insincerely for Blue) 15.6% of the time and they vote sincerely
according to their r-signal (they vote for Red), 84.4% of the time. Equivalently, we predict
that an average of 15.6% of signal type-r subjects will vote against their signal each round.
The equilibrium predictions for the voluntary mechanism without voting costs (VN)
are that participation rates should depend on the signal received, red (r) or blue (b). We
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Voluntary Voting p∗r p
∗
b c
∗
r c
∗
b
VN (costless) 0.5387 1.000 n/a n/a
VC (costly) 0.2700 0.5497 2.70 5.50
Table 2: Sincere Voting Equilibrium Predictions for the Voluntary Voting Treatments
denote these equilibrium participation rates by p∗r and p
∗
b . A further equilibrium prediction
is that conditional on choosing to participate, all voters should vote sincerely, according to
their signal. The same type of equilibrium behavior is predicted under the voluntary but
costly voting mechanism (VC), but in the latter case the equilibrium predictions can be
alternatively stated in terms of cut-off levels for the cost of voting for the two signal types,
denoted by c∗r, c
∗
b . Table 2 summarizes the predicted values of these variables in the sincere
voting equilibrium of our two voluntary voting treatments.
We can show (a proof is available on request) that the sincere voting equilibrium described
above is unique in the case of the voluntary and costly (VC) voting mechanism. However,
under the voluntary and costless voting mechanism (VN), the insincere voting equilibrium
that is the unique symmetric equilibrium under the compulsory (C) voting mechanism is also
an equilibrium under the VN mechanism. This insincere voting equilibrium would require full
participation by all voters under the VN mechanism, i.e., p∗r = p
∗
b = 1.0, (even though voters
are free to abstain under the voluntary mechanism) and would further predict that 15.6% of
type-r voters vote insincerely. However, it is easily shown that under the VN mechanism, this
insincere voting equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the sincere voting equilibrium involving
less than 100 percent participation by signal type-r players as described in Table 2. These
two equilibria are the only symmetric equilibria in weakly undominated strategies under the
voluntary and costless voting mechanism. Thus, for the VN treatment alone there is an open
and interesting question of equilibrium selection that our experiment can address; for the
other two treatments we have unique symmetric equilibrium predictions.
A final issue concerns the efficiency of group decisions. Let us denote by W (ρ) and
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Voting Mechanism W (ρ) W (β) 1
2
W (ρ) + 1
2
W (β)
C 0.9582 0.8485 0.9033
VN 0.9513 0.9106 0.9309
VC 0.8572 0.8501 0.8536
Table 3: Efficiency Comparisons
W (β) the probabilities of making a correct decision by the group assigned to the red and
the blue jar, respectively (recall that the red jar corresponds to state ρ while the blue jar, to
state β). The theory predicts that W (ρ) is greater than W (β) under all three mechanisms
(compulsory, voluntary and costless, and voluntary and costly) although the difference is
negligible under the voluntary and costly mechanism. W (ρ) and W (β) are measures of the
informational efficiency of group decisions, hence the group assigned to the red jar (which
entails more precise correct signals) is predicted to attain higher informational efficiency.
Table 3 shows the predicted values for W (ρ) and W (β).
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, if we take the equal weighted average of W (ρ) and
W (β) as the overall efficiency measure for each voting mechanism (recall the equal prior over
the two states), then the theory also gives us a ranking of the mechanisms in terms of the
efficiency of group decisions; namely, the voluntary and costless mechanism is the best, the
compulsory mechanism is second best and the voluntary and costly mechanism is the worst
(if we consider the aggregate cost spent by those who participate in voting under the latter
mechanism, then it is even worse).
Based on the equilibrium predictions, we now formally state our research hypotheses:
H1. The fraction of those who vote against their signals (insincerely) is significantly greater
than zero (15.6% of subjects with signal r) when voting is compulsory while it is zero
when voting is voluntary.
H2. Under the voluntary voting mechanisms, subjects with b signals (type-b) participate at a
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higher rate than subjects with r signals (type-r); p∗r < p
∗
b . Furthermore, the participation
rate is higher under the voluntary and costless mechanism than under the voluntary and
costly mechanism for each signal type.
H3. Under all three voting mechanisms, the probability of making a correct decision is strictly
higher for the group assigned to the red jar than for the group assigned to the blue jar;
W (ρ) > W (β). Moreover, the three voting mechanisms can be ranked according to their
ex-ante aggregate efficiency (1
2
W (ρ) + 1
2
W (β)); V N > C > V C.
3.5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We report results from twelve experimental sessions (four sessions for each of the compulsory,
voluntary and costless, and voluntary and costly treatments) with 18 subjects playing 20
rounds in each session. Overall, we find strong support for all three of our main research
hypotheses. The next three sections discuss the support for each hypothesis in detail.
3.5.1 Sincerity/Insincerity of Voting Decisions
Finding 1. Consistent with theoretical predictions, there is strong evidence of insincere
voting by red-signal types under the compulsory voting mechanism. By contrast, nearly all
voters of both signal types vote sincerely under both voluntary mechanisms (no cost and
costly).
Figure 6 shows the observed frequency of insincere voting under the three treatments. In
the compulsory treatment (C), the proportion of type-r voters (those who drew a red ball)
who voted insincerely was greater than 10% (recall that red (r) signal types are the only type
who are predicted to vote insincerely with positive probability). By contrast the frequency
of insincere voting by type-b voters (those who drew a blue ball) under the compulsory (C)
treatment as well as both signal types under the two other treatments (VN and VC) was
always less than 5%. Thus Figure 6 suggests that there is a large difference in the sincerity of
voting decisions between type-r voters in treatment C and all voters in all three treatments.
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Figure 6: Overall Frequency of Insincere Voting. Pooled Data from All Rounds of All Sessions
of Each of the Three Treatments
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Table 4 shows disaggregated, session-level averages of the frequency of sincere voting in
all 12 sessions by signal type. This table reveals that Nash equilibrium performs rather well in
predicting the qualitative (if not the quantitative) results for our voting games of compulsory
or voluntary participation. With a couple of exceptions, the frequency of sincere voting is
close to 100% under the voluntary voting mechanisms. The decomposition of sincere voting
behavior by signal types indicates that, consistent with theoretical predictions, subjects who
participated in voting voted sincerely regardless of the signals drawn under both voluntary
voting mechanisms. On the other hand, we do find evidence for insincere (or strategic) voting
under the compulsory mechanism among subjects drawing a red ball; slightly more than 10%
of type-r voters voted insincerely which is close to, though slightly lower than the equilibrium
prediction of 15.6%. It is also interesting to note that the behavior of subjects under the
compulsory mechanism was remarkably consistent across sessions in terms of the average
frequencies of sincere voting between signal types. The data seem to confirm the prediction
that the voting mechanism in place (compulsory vs. voluntary) affects the incentives for
subjects to vote sincerely or insincerely.
Are the differences in voting behavior between mechanisms statistically significant? To
answer this question, we conducted a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test using the
session-level observations reported in Table 4. The null hypothesis is that the frequen-
cies of sincere voting (4 session-level observations per treatment) from the two mechanisms
under consideration come from the same distribution. Table 5 reports the rank sums as well
as p-values for each pairwise treatment comparison.
First, consider the sincerity of voting by type-r subjects. The comparison between com-
pulsory (C) and voluntary but costly (VC) treatments reveals a clear difference in the sincer-
ity of voting.16 Given the high frequency of sincere voting under the VC mechanism, we can
say that subjects indeed behaved strategically under the C mechanism. We obtain the same
result in the comparison between type-r subjects in the compulsory (C) treatment and type-r
subjects in the combined voluntary treatments (V=VN+VC) as a group. Furthermore, we
16We report p-values from one-sided tests of the null of no difference in all pairwise comparisons (in Table
5) between treatment C and the ‘V’ treatments, VN, VC or V=VN+VC that involves voting behavior by
type-r subjects. That is because we have a clear directional hypothesis that type-r subjects should have voted
“less sincerely” in the C treatment versus the ‘V’ treatments. The same reasoning applies to all subsequent
comparisons (in Table 6, Table 8, Table 9, and Table 11) for which one-sided tests and p-values are reported.
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Treatment/
Sessiona Red (vr)
b Blue (vb)
C1 0.8956 (249)c 0.9910 (111)
C2 0.8730 (244) 0.9914 (116)
C3 0.8970 (233) 0.9921 (127)
C4 0.9190 (247) 0.9558 (113)
C Overall 0.8962 (973) 0.9829 (467)
C Predicted 0.8440 1.0000
VN1 0.8871 (186) 0.9914 (116)
VN2 1.0000 (154) 0.9848 (132)
VN3 0.9752 (161) 0.9048 (105)
VN4 0.9524 (168) 0.9917 (121)
VN Overall 0.9507 (669) 0.9705 (474)
VN Predicted 1.0000 1.0000
VC1 0.9794 (97) 0.9600 (75)
VC2 0.9706 (102) 1.0000 (86)
VC3 0.9444 (108) 0.9574 (94)
VC4 0.9277 (83) 0.9286 (84)
VC Overall 0.9564 (390) 0.9617 (339)
VC Predicted 1.0000 1.0000
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless,
VC=Voluntary & Costly.
b vs is the frequency of sincere voting by type-s.
c Number of observations is in parentheses.
Table 4: Observed Frequency of Sincere Voting by Sig-
nal Type
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Red Signal C vs. VNa C vs. VC VN vs. VC C vs. V
Sum of ranks WC = 13 WC = 10 WV N = 19 WC = 13
WV N = 23 WV C = 26 WV C = 17 WV = 65
p-value 0.0745† 0.0105† 0.7728 0.0136†
Blue Signal C vs. VN C vs. VC VN vs. VC C vs. V
Sum of ranks WC = 19.5 WC = 20 WV N = 19 WC = 29.5
WV N = 16.5 WV C = 16 WV C = 17 WV = 48.5
p-value 0.6631 0.5637 0.7728 0.5515
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary &
Costly.
† One-sided p-values.
Table 5: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Differences in the Sincerity
of Voting Between Treatments by Signal Type
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cannot reject the null hypothesis of the same frequency of (sincere) voting between both
voluntary mechanisms for type-r subjects (VN versus VC).
We note that the evidence for a significant difference in sincere voting behavior by type-r
subjects between the C and VN mechanisms is weak (p=.0745), suggesting that subjects
under the voluntary but costless (VN) treatment have voted “less sincerely” as compared
with the voluntary and costly (VC) treatment. According to the theory, the existence (or
absence) of voting cost affects only participation decisions, and not voting decisions; hence,
if subjects were playing in accordance with the sincere voting equilibrium they should have
voted sincerely regardless of cost under both voluntary mechanisms. The weakly significant
difference between the VN and C treatments has two possible explanations. First, recall that
under the VN treatment, the symmetric insincere voting equilibrium of the C treatment co-
exists with the symmetric sincere voting equilibrium; the coexistence of these two symmetric
equilibria may have resulted in a coordination problem for subjects. As a second explana-
tion, we believe that subjects in the VN treatment may not think too seriously about their
participation/abstention decisions because in the VN treatment participation is “free,” and
given that participation rates by type-r subjects are higher than the predicted rates (as we
will show below), these type-r subjects might have been better off voting insincerely to raise
the probability of reaching a correct decision in the event that their group is assigned to the
blue jar. We will come back to the latter explanation later in the chapter when we attempt
to rationalize the departures we observe from sincere voting using behavioral models.
As for the voting behavior of type-b subjects, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no difference in the sincerity of voting for any of the four pairwise comparisons (C vs. VN,
C vs. VC, VN vs. VC and C vs. V, where V again stands for the combined data from
the costly and costless voluntary mechanisms). This leads to the conclusion that, consistent
with all equilibrium predictions, the high sincerity of type-b subjects’ voting decisions is
constant across all treatments of our experiment. The test statistics also suggest that type-b
subjects voted slightly “more sincerely” under the C treatment though that difference is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
As a further test of the equilibrium predictions, we also ask whether red and blue types
behaved the same (in terms of sincere voting) under a given voting mechanism/treatment.
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Ca VN VC V (VN & VC)
Rank sum positive - 0 positive - 4 positive - 3 positive - 14
negative - 10 negative - 6 negative - 7 negative - 22
p-value 0.0340† 0.7150 0.4652 0.5754
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary & Costly.
† One-sided p-value.
Table 6: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Difference in the Sincerity of
Voting Between Signal Types
Table 6 shows the results of a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for matched pairs with the null
hypothesis being that the frequencies of sincere voting are the same between signal types
under a fixed voting mechanism. For the purpose of this test, we paired both types’ observed
frequencies of sincere voting in each session and generated 4 signed differences for each of
the 3 treatments and 8 signed differences for the voluntary treatment as a group. Clearly,
the only mechanism under which both types’ behavior exhibits a significant difference was
the compulsory voting mechanism. This finding again confirms our hypothesis regarding
equilibrium voting behavior, which postulates that only the red signal type under the C
treatment will vote insincerely. Under the two voluntary mechanisms individually or as a
group, we never find any difference in the sincerity of voting decisions between signal types,
which is consistent with equilibrium predictions.
3.5.2 Participation Decisions
Finding 2. Under voluntary voting, the difference in participation rates by signal types are
in accordance with the symmetric, sincere voting equilibrium predictions. However, subjects
in both voluntary voting treatments and of both signal types over-participate relative to these
equilibrium predictions.
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Figure 7: Overall Participation Rates, Pooled Data from All Rounds of All Sessions of Each
of the Three Treatments
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Treatment/
Sessiona Red (pr)
b Blue (pb)
VN1 0.7815 (238)c 0.9508 (122)
VN2 0.6906 (223) 0.9635 (137)
VN3 0.6545 (246) 0.9211 (114)
VN4 0.7273 (231) 0.9380 (129)
VN Overall 0.7132 (938) 0.9442 (502)
VN Predicted 0.5397 1.0000
VC1 0.4128 (235) 0.6000 (125)
VC2 0.4250 (240) 0.7167 (120)
VC3 0.4519 (239) 0.7769 (121)
VC4 0.3444 (241) 0.7059 (119)
VC Overall 0.4084 (955) 0.6990 (485)
VC Predicted 0.2700 0.5497
a VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary &
Costly.
b ps is the participation rate of type-s.
c Number of observations is in parentheses.
Table 7: Observed Participation Rates by Signal Type
in the Voluntary Treatments
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VNa VC V (VN & VC)
rank sum positive - 0 positive - 0 positive - 0
negative - 10 negative - 10 negative - 36
p-value 0.0340b 0.0340 0.0059
a VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary & Costly.
b All p-values are one-sided.
Table 8: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Differences in Par-
ticipation Rates Between Signal Types
Support for Finding 2 comes from Figure 7 and Table 7, where we observe that, consistent
with theoretical predictions the participation rate of type-b voters was substantially greater
than that of type-r voters throughout all sessions of the voluntary treatments. Since blue
balls were rare relative to red balls, type-b voters have more of an incentive to participate
in voting decisions (and of course to vote sincerely). As reported in Table 8, Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests (on the session level data shown in Table 7) lead us to reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in participation rates at the lowest possible significance level
given four observations for each of the two voluntary treatments (or eight observations for
the voluntary treatments as a group). This finding is a natural consequence of the fact
that the observed difference between participation rates (pˆb− pˆr) in each session was always
positive without exception in both voluntary voting treatments.
We further observe that each signal type participated at a higher rate under the VN
treatment than under the VC treatment, which is also consistent with the theoretical predic-
tion that the introduction of voting costs will reduce participation incentives for all types. As
Table 9 reveals, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test applied to the session–level data reported in
Table 7 allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in participation rates by signal
type between the two voluntary treatments (p < .05) since all four participation observa-
tions in the VN treatment rank higher than those in the VC treatment for both signal types.
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VN vs. VCa
Red WV N = 26 WV C = 10 p-value = 0.0105
b
Blue WV N = 26 WV C = 10 p-value = 0.0105
a VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary &
Costly.
b Both p-values are one-sided.
Table 9: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Differ-
ences in Participation Rates Between Treatments
Therefore, the participation behavior observed in our data strongly supports the qualitative
predictions of the Nash equilibrium.
However, as stated in Finding 2, we also observe that subjects tended to participate in
voting at a higher rate than the equilibrium prediction, with the lone exception of type-b
subjects under the VN treatment (the predicted participation rate is one for this type). This
tendency for over-participation was also observed by Levine and Palfrey (2007), (when the
electorate was sufficiently large, as in our case) with the rate of over-participation increasing
with the group size. They explain such systematic tendency to over-participation using
the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), an equilibrium concept that formalizes
noisy best response. We will explore whether QRE estimates of both voting behavior and
participation rates can help to explain the data from our experiment later in section 7. In
particular, the participation by type-r voters was high under the VN mechanism to the point
of changing their incentives with regard to voting decisions. Given such high participation
rates, type-r players should have voted insincerely with a positive (but small) probability. We
speculate that, despite our neutral framing of the problem (i.e, our avoidance of all references
to voting), subjects may nevertheless have had a negative feeling about selecting the “No
Choice” option and thus avoided choosing it when they should have. Offering a proper
incentive to select No Choice, as in our costly voting treatment with its NC bonus, provides
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a better test of the importance of the voluntary voting mechanism in our opinion and it
appears to have worked to reduce any stigma that might have been attached to choosing
“No choice”.
We further note that while the participation rate of type-r subjects in the VN treatment
is high, it is still well below 100 percent (the average participation rate across all sessions of
this treatment is 71.3 percent). Recall that the unique symmetric insincere voting equilib-
rium under compulsory voting mechanism is an alternative symmetric equilibrium possibility
under the VN mechanism. However, that insincere voting equilibrium would require 100 per-
cent participation and more insincere voting by type-r subjects than we observe in the data
from our VN treatment. Thus on the question of equilibrium selection, the data from our
VN treatment seem closer to and more in accordance with the symmetric sincere voting
equilibrium which, as noted earlier, payoff dominates the insincere voting equilibrium. We
address this equilibrium selection issue in further detail later in section 3.6.1.
3.5.3 Accuracy of Group Decisions
Finding 3. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the probability of making a correct de-
cision is strictly higher for the group assigned to the red jar than for the group assigned
to the blue jar, i.e., W (ρ) > W (β). Further the ranking of the voting mechanisms with
respect to the ex-ante aggregate efficiency measure (1
2
W (ρ) + 1
2
W (β)), is as predicted, with
V N > C > V C. However, these efficiency differences are not statistically significant from
one another in our experimental data.
Recall that our measure of decision-making efficiency is the probability W (ω) of making
the correct decision in each state ω ∈ {ρ, β}. For notational convenience, let us denote the
group that is assigned to the red jar as the ρ group and the group that is assigned to the
blue jar as the β group. Consistent with theoretical predictions, Table 10 reveals that the
ρ group made correct decisions significantly more frequently than did the β group across
all treatments. We further observe that the frequencies of correct decisions by the ρ group
tended to be higher than equilibrium predictions, while the frequency of correct decisions
by the β group were generally lower than equilibrium predictions, with some exceptions in
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Treatment/
Sessiona W (ρ)b W (β) Aggregatec
C1 0.9500 0.6000 0.7750
C2 1.0000 0.8500 0.9250
C3 1.0000 0.7500 0.8750
C4 1.0000 0.7000 0.8500
C Overall 0.9875 0.7250 0.8563
C Predicted 0.9582 0.8485 0.9033
VN1 1.0000 0.8000 0.9000
VN2 1.0000 0.9250 0.9625
VN3 1.0000 0.6000 0.8000
VN4 0.9750 0.8750 0.9250
VN Overall 0.9938 0.8000 0.8969
VN Predicted 0.9513 0.9106 0.9309
VC1 0.8750 0.7250 0.8000
VC2 0.9000 0.7750 0.8375
VC3 0.9250 0.9000 0.9125
VC4 0.8250 0.8250 0.8250
VC Overall 0.8813 0.8063 0.8438
VC Predicted 0.8572 0.8501 0.8536
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless,
VC=Voluntary & Costly.
b W (ω) is the probability that group ω makes the correct
decision.
c Aggregate efficiency ≡ 1
2
W (ρ) + 1
2
W (β).
Table 10: Observed Efficiency by Group
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C vs. VNa C vs. VC VN vs. VC
rank sum WC = 14.5 WC = 20 WV N = 21.5
WV N = 21.5 WV C = 16 WV C = 14.5
p-value 0.1547b 0.2819 0.1547
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless,
VC=Voluntary & Costly.
b All p-values are one-sided.
Table 11: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Differences
in Efficiency Between Treatments
several sessions.
These success frequencies are, of course, closely tied to participation decisions and voting
behavior. The observed discrepancy follows from the higher than predicted rates of voter
participation under the voluntary mechanisms and from the lower than predicted rates of
insincere voting under the compulsory mechanism by type-r voters who drove up the success
rates when they were in the ρ group, but drove up the error rate when they were in the β
group, which explains the low success rates of the β group. This same finding continues to
obtain in voluntary voting treatments where a much smaller fraction of type-r voters voted
insincerely.
Finally, recall our prediction concerning the ranking of voting mechanisms in terms of ex-
ante efficiency: groups were predicted to make correct decisions with the highest frequency
under the voluntary and costless mechanism (VN), followed by the compulsory mechanism
(C) and then by the voluntary and costly mechanism (VC). Our data produce this same
ranking; the probability of correct decisions in the three regimes is, VN: 0.8969; C: 0.8563;
and VC: 0.8438. These observed efficiency measures are lower than the predicted ones under
all mechanisms/treatments. Table 11 shows the results of a test of whether the observed
differences in efficiency are statistically significant between pairs of treatments. As the Table
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11 reveals, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in any pairwise comparison
(p > .10 for all three tests). This result might be due to our small number of observations
(just four independent observations for each treatment) but it could also be due to the fact
that the theoretically predicted differences are themselves very small for the group size of 9
that we have considered in our experiment. Since in the limit, information aggregation holds
(i.e., the probability of making a correct group decision goes to one along all the informative
equilibria as the size of the electorate goes to infinity) under all three mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Krishna and Morgan (2011)), we would expect that the
observed differences in efficiency would decrease as the size of the electorate was made even
larger than in our experimental design.
3.5.4 Individual Behavior
Thus far we have only considered behavior at the aggregate group and signal type level. In
this section we delve deeper and explore the behavior of individual subjects under the three
voting mechanisms. Figure 8 provides pairwise comparisons of the cumulative distributions
of the frequency of sincere voting by all subjects between different voting mechanisms for
each signal type or between two different signal types for a given voting mechanism. Figure 9
provides similar pairwise comparisons of the cumulative distributions of voting participation
rates for the voluntary treatments.
One implication of the theory is that the frequency of sincere voting by type-r players
should be stochastically greater under the voluntary (VN or VC) mechanisms than under
the compulsory (C) mechanism and that the same frequency for type-r players should be
stochastically lower than that for type-b players under the compulsory (C) mechanism. This
is the usual first-order stochastic dominance relationship, hence the cumulative distribution
of a stochastically larger variable should lie everywhere below that of a stochastically smaller
one. However, for all the other comparisons between mechanisms/types, the distributions are
predicted to coincide. If we look at Figure 8, we can indeed find this relationship in our data;
in particular, the main difference between the two distributions occurs in the neighborhood of
the mixed equilibrium frequency, 0.844, of sincere voting by type-r voters in the C treatment
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Figure 8: Distribution of the Frequency of Sincere Voting by Mechanism / Signal Type
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(which is indicated by the dashed line labeled “Nash” in graphs depicting the cumulative
frequency of sincere voting by type-r subjects in the C treatments). Consider the first two
graphs in the first row of Figure 8 which compare the behavior of type-r subjects in the C
vs. VN and C vs. VC treatments, respectively. Consider also the comparison between the
two signal types (r and b) under the C mechanism alone (the first graph in the third row of
Figure 8). In these three cases alone, there is a predicted stochastic-order relationship. In
particular, the cumulative distribution of the frequency of sincere voting by type-r players
in the C treatment should lie to the left of (or above) the cumulative distribution of the
comparison group in these three graphs; more precisely the cumulative distribution of the
frequency of sincere voting by type-r players in the C treatment should shift from 0% to
100% at the mixed equilibrium probability of .844. In all other pairwise comparisons the
frequency of sincere voting is predicted to be 100% and so the cumulative distributions
should coincide in those cases. Figure 8 reveals that, consistent with theoretical predictions,
the cumulative frequency distribution of sincere voting by type-r players under the C voting
mechanism is quite different from the cumulative frequency distribution of sincere voting by
the comparison group. In particular, there is always a larger mass of type-r subjects voting
insincerely under the C voting mechanism. Alternatively put, at 100% sincere voting, there
is a large gap between the two cumulative frequencies, equal to 25% in the C/type-r vs.
C/type-b comparison, 15.8% in the C/type-r vs. VN/type-r comparison or 12.6% in the
C/type-r vs. VC/type-r comparison while the difference is relatively small in all other cases
(precisely, it ranges from 1 to 7.7%).17
The theory also predicts stochastic-order relationships between the distributions of par-
ticipation rates. Namely, the distribution of participation rates for type-r players should lie
above the distribution of participation rates for type-b players under both voluntary mech-
anisms, and the distribution of participation rates for the VC mechanism should lie above
the distribution of participation rates for the VN mechanism for both signal types. Pair-
wise comparisons of the cumulative frequency distributions of participation rates (and Nash
17 Nevertheless, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of differences between the cumulative frequency distributions
of sincere voting fails to detect a significant difference between C/type-r and VN/type-r or C/type-r and
VC/type-r (the p-values are 0.191 and 0.339, respectively). However, the difference in cumulative frequency
distributions of sincere voting between C/type-r and C/type-b is significant at 1% level (p-value=0.011)
according to the same test.
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Figure 9: Distribution of Participation Rates by Mechanism / Signal Type
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equilibrium predictions) are shown in Figure 9. As that figure makes clear, the observed dif-
ferences in the distributions of participation decisions are all in the right direction providing
strong support for the comparative statics hypotheses about participation rates even at the
individual level of our experimental data.18
3.6 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY
We have presented strong evidence in support of the comparative statics equilibrium pre-
dictions of the theory with respect to the impact of the various voting mechanisms on the
sincerity of voting, participation decisions and the accuracy of group decisions. Neverthe-
less, we have also found some differences between the equilibrium point predictions and the
experimental data, for example, over-participation relative to equilibrium predictions under
the voluntary mechanisms. In this section we consider whether some models of boundedly
rational behavior might help us to better account for these anomalous findings.
3.6.1 Equilibrium Plus Noise
Perhaps the simplest model of “noise” in the data is the so-called equilibrium-plus-noise
model.19 In this approach, the predicted choice probability p(η) (sincere voting or partici-
pation choice) is a weighted average of the equilibrium prediction, p, and a purely random
choice probability of 1
2
:
p(η) = ηp+ (1− η)1
2
,
where η ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ {vr, vb, pr, pb} with vs and ps, respectively, representing the equilib-
rium probability of sincere voting (given participation, in the voluntary treatments) and the
probability of participation in voting by signal type s ∈ {r, b}. Here, η is a simple measure of
the “closeness” of the data to equilibrium predictions; η = 0 corresponds to random choices
18 Indeed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate significant differences in the cumulative frequency distri-
butions of participation rates in all four pairwise comparisons, - either at the 1% level (VN/type-r vs.
VN/type-b) or at the 0.1% level (the other 3 comparisons).
19 See, e.g., Blume et al. (2009).
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whereas η = 1 corresponds to equilibrium play. We further impose the restriction that the
weight η assigned to the choice probabilities is the same for both signal types and for both
voting and participation decisions in any given treatment (however, we allow η to vary from
treatment to treatment).
To construct a likelihood function, let ωs denote the total number of signal type-s sub-
jects; τs, the number of type-s subjects who participate in voting; and σs, the total number
of type-s subjects who vote sincerely (among all type-s subjects in the compulsory treatment
and among all type-s participants in the voluntary treatments). The likelihood function is
then proportional to
L(η) = vr(η)σr(1− vr(η))ωr−σrvb(η)σb(1− vb(η))ωb−σb ,
in case of the compulsory (C) treatment, and to
L(η) = vr(η)σr(1− vr(η))τr−σrvb(η)σb(1− vb(η))τb−σb
× pr(η)τr(1− pr(η))ωr−τrpb(η)τb(1− pb(η))ωb−τb ,
in case of the voluntary (VN or VC) treatments. Our restriction on η requires us to use pooled
data from all sessions of a given treatment in maximizing the above likelihood functions.
Table 12 reports results from a maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the equilibrium-
plus-noise model using data from all 20 rounds or from the first or last 10 rounds of all sessions
of a given treatment. The observed frequencies of sincere voting and participation (from the
experimental data) are denoted by vˆs and pˆs and the corresponding estimates based on the
equilibrium-plus-noise model are denoted by vs(ηˆ) and ps(ηˆ) and ηˆ. The table also shows
the results of likelihood ratio tests that compare the likelihood function for the unrestricted
equilibrium-plus-noise model (with estimates ηˆ) with those for a restricted version where
η = 0 implying purely random choices. We use the same numbers of observations (ωs, τs and
σs) when evaluating the likelihood functions of both the restricted and unrestricted models.
The last column of Table 12 in particular reports the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics
(LR Stat ≡ −2 ln l, where l is the ratio of the restricted to the unrestricted likelihood
functions) that can be evaluated under the null hypothesis (H0) of no difference between the
restricted and the unrestricted models. The LR test statistic follows a χ2 distribution with
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Treatment† vˆr‡ vr(ηˆ) vˆb vb(ηˆ) pˆr pr(ηˆ) pˆb pb(ηˆ) ηˆ LR Stat
C 0.896 0.837 0.983 0.989 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.979 1236.74
First 10 rounds 0.902 0.835 0.978 0.987 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.974 616.13
Last 10 rounds 0.890 0.838 0.987 0.991 n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.983 620.99
Nash 0.844 1.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
VN (Sincere) 0.951 0.956 0.970 0.956 0.713 0.536 0.944 0.956 0.912 1723.73
First 10 rounds 0.951 0.955 0.982 0.955 0.726 0.536 0.931 0.955 0.910 855.11
Last 10 rounds 0.951 0.956 0.959 0.956 0.700 0.536 0.957 0.956 0.913 868.64
Nash 1.00 1.00 0.540 1.00
VN (Insincere) 0.951 0.753 0.970 0.867 0.713 0.867 0.944 0.867 0.734 1414.56
First 10 rounds 0.951 0.755 0.982 0.871 0.726 0.871 0.931 0.871 0.741 721.85
Last 10 rounds 0.951 0.750 0.959 0.864 0.700 0.864 0.957 0.864 0.727 692.97
Nash 0.844 1.00 1.00 1.00
VC 0.956 0.944 0.962 0.944 0.408 0.296 0.699 0.544 0.888 764.96
First 10 rounds 0.946 0.928 0.951 0.928 0.440 0.303 0.723 0.542 0.856 364.91
Last 10 rounds 0.968 0.961 0.974 0.961 0.379 0.288 0.672 0.546 0.922 403.17
Nash 1.00 1.00 0.270 0.550
† C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary & Costly.
‡ vˆs is the observed frequency of sincere voting, and pˆs is the observed participation rate, both by
type-s; (·)(ηˆ) is the corresponding estimated frequency or rate.
Table 12: Equilibrium-Plus-Noise Model: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, in this case, 1. Finally, in the case
of the VN treatment only, we assess the fit of the equilibrium-plus-noise model using two
different symmetric equilibrium probability vectors: one corresponding to the sincere voting
equilibrium vector (labeled ‘Sincere’) and the other corresponding to the insincere voting
equilibrium (labeled ‘Insincere’).
We observe that our data are very close to the Nash equilibrium point predictions for
all treatments, as indicated by the high estimated values for ηˆ. We also observe that the
data from the compulsory voting treatment are significantly closer to equilibrium predictions
than are the data from the two voluntary voting treatments. This difference is largely due to
the over-participation we observed in the voluntary treatments as reported in the previous
section. Since we measure the closeness of both the voting and participation decisions to
equilibrium predictions using a single estimate, ηˆ, for each treatment (recall our restriction
on η), a consequence is that we obtain lower values for ηˆ for the voluntary treatments.
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We do find some improvement in the estimate of ηˆ for all voting mechanisms as we move
from the first to the last 10 rounds (with the exception of ηˆ for the VN insincere equilibrium
specification) meaning that subjects’ behavior gets closer to the equilibrium predictions with
experience.
Given the closeness of our data to the equilibrium predictions, it is perhaps not so sur-
prising that we obtain the high likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics reported in Table 12. By
construction, these statistics (and the corresponding p-values) measure the extent to which
the equilibrium-plus-noise model outperforms a purely random choice model. Since all re-
ported LR statistics are well above the critical value for the χ2 statistic that corresponds to a
p-value= 0.001 (which is 10.828 with d.f.=1), we can safely reject the null of random decision
making in favor of the restricted model were subjects are close to playing the equilibrium
predictions at the 0.1% level (or lower).
Regarding the issue of equilibrium selection under the VN mechanism, we can use our
simple equilibrium-plus-noise model to assess which symmetric equilibrium provides a better
characterization of the play of subjects in our VN treatment. As Table 12 reveals, when we
use the symmetric sincere voting equilibrium probability vector as the benchmark, we obtain
a much higher value for ηˆ (approximately .91) than we do if we use the symmetric insincere
voting equilibrium probability vector as the benchmark (in which case the estimate of ηˆ is
approximately .73). We thus conclude that, on the question of equilibrium selection, behavior
in the VN sessions is better characterized by the symmetric sincere voting equilibrium than
by the symmetric insincere voting equilibrium.
3.6.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium
A main drawback of the equilibrium-plus-noise model is that it does not rationally account
for the possibility that subjects may be best responding to the noise they observe in the data.
An equilibrium concept that formalizes this idea is the quantal response equilibrium or QRE,
(McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2005)) which we now apply
to our experimental data. In particular, we consider the logit quantal response equilibrium
model and assume that our subjects make decisions according to a stochastic, logistic choice
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rule.
In the quantal response equilibrium model, we calculate the choice probabilities as (quan-
tal response) functions of the expected payoffs. Given the slope λ of the logistic quantal
response function, the voting strategy of a subject can be written as:
vr(λ) =
1
1 + exp[−λ{U(R|r)− U(B|r)}] , (3.1)
vb(λ) =
1
1 + exp[−λ{U(B|b)− U(R|b)}] . (3.2)
where vs is again defined as the probability of voting sincerely, given signal s ∈ {r, b}.
Here, λ is understood to measure the “degree of rationality”; λ = 0 corresponds to random
behavior whereas λ =∞ corresponds to equilibrium behavior (perfect rationality). We can
also specify participation strategies in a similar way. Under the voluntary and costless (VN)
treatment, we have:
pr(λ) =
1
1+exp[−λ{vr(λ)(U(R|r)−U(φ|r))+(1−vr(λ))(U(B|r)−U(φ|r))}] , (3.3)
pb(λ) =
1
1+exp[−λ{vb(λ)(U(B|b)−U(φ|b))+(1−vb(λ))(U(R|b)−U(φ|b))}] , (3.4)
and under the voluntary and costly (VC) treatment we have,
pr(λ) =
1
1+exp[λ{ pr(λ)
10
−vr(λ)(U(R|r)−U(φ|r))−(1−vr(λ))(U(B|r)−U(φ|r))}]
, (3.5)
pb(λ) =
1
1+exp[λ{ pb(λ)
10
−vb(λ)(U(B|b)−U(φ|b))−(1−vb(λ))(U(R|b)−U(φ|b))}]
, (3.6)
where ps is, as before, the rate of participation in voting, given signal s ∈ {r, b}. We treat
the model parameter λ as a constant to be estimated. For the compulsory (C) treatment,
we solve for (vr(λ), vb(λ)), the system of equations (1)-(2). For the voluntary treatments, we
solve for (vr(λ), vb(λ), pr(λ), pb(λ)), the system of equations (1)-(4) for the VN mechanism
and the system of equations (1)-(2) and (5)-(6) for the VC mechanism. We restrict λ to be
the same for both signal types and for both voting and participation strategies in any given
treatment (however, we allow λ to vary from treatment to treatment).
To construct the likelihood function, let ωs denote the total number of type-s subjects;
τs, the number of type-s subjects who participate in voting; and σs, the number of type-
s subjects who vote sincerely (among all type-s subjects in the compulsory treatment and
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Treatment† vˆr‡ vr(λˆ) vˆb vb(λˆ) pˆr pr(λˆ) pˆb pb(λˆ) λˆ LR Stat
C 0.896 0.797 0.983 0.994 n/a n/a n/a n/a 42.33 1191.53
First 10 rounds 0.902 0.795 0.978 0.992 n/a n/a n/a n/a 40.22 590.69
Last 10 rounds 0.890 0.800 0.987 0.996 n/a n/a n/a n/a 45.16 601.35
Nash 0.844 1.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a
VN 0.951 0.944 0.970 0.997 0.713 0.531 0.944 0.877 48.59 1652.40
First 10 rounds 0.951 0.950 0.982 0.998 0.726 0.531 0.931 0.888 51.92 843.75
Last 10 rounds 0.951 0.939 0.959 0.996 0.700 0.531 0.957 0.868 45.69 809.67
Nash 1.00 1.00 0.540 1.00
VC 0.956 0.909 0.962 0.984 0.408 0.361 0.699 0.554 20.75 798.82
First 10 rounds 0.946 0.888 0.951 0.976 0.440 0.371 0.723 0.550 18.37 387.61
Last 10 rounds 0.968 0.934 0.974 0.992 0.379 0.348 0.672 0.558 24.39 415.67
Nash 1.00 1.00 0.270 0.550
† C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless, VC=Voluntary & Costly.
‡ vˆs is the observed frequency of sincere voting, and pˆs is the observed participation rate, both by
type-s; (·)(λˆ) is the corresponding estimated frequency or rate.
Table 13: Quantal Response Equilibrium: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
among all type-s participants in the voluntary treatments). The likelihood function is then
proportional to
L(λ) = vr(λ)σr(1− vr(λ))ωr−σrvb(λ)σb(1− vb(λ))ωb−σb
in case of the compulsory (C) treatment, and to
L(λ) = vr(λ)σr(1− vr(λ))τr−σrvb(λ)σb(1− vb(λ))τb−σb
× pr(λ)τr(1− pr(λ))ωr−τrpb(λ)τb(1− pb(λ))ωb−τb
in case of the voluntary (VN or VC) treatments. Our restriction on λ requires us to use pooled
data from all sessions of a given treatment in maximizing the above likelihood functions.
Table 13 reports the results from maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the quantal
response equilibrium model.20 As in the previous subsection, vˆs and pˆs denote the observed
20Unlike Table 12 for the VN treatment we cannot use QRE estimates to compare between the two
symmetric equilibrium possibilities that arise under the VN mechanism, as they involve different likelihood
functions (one with participation choices and the other without participation choices) preventing us from
making a fair comparison between the two types of equilibria. For this reason, we only report in Table 13
QRE estimates for the sincere voting equilibrium specification using the VN treatment data.
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probabilities of sincere voting and participation while vs(λˆ) and ps(λˆ), denote the estimated
probabilities. The table reports the estimates vs(λˆ), ps(λˆ) and λˆ (with the corresponding
observed probabilities vˆs and pˆs) from all rounds as well as from the first and the last 10
rounds of all sessions of each treatment. The table also shows the results of likelihood ratio
(LR) tests that compare the unrestricted model with the restricted one, with the former
being the quantal response equilibrium model and the restriction in the latter model being
λ = 0 (purely random behavior). The details concerning the LR test statistics are exactly
the same as in the previous subsection.
As Table 13 reveals, the estimated slope coefficients, λˆ, of the quantal response function
are quite high for all three treatments. In other words, subjects demonstrated a substantial
degree of rationality in all three voting treatments. Similar evidence of rational voter behav-
ior is also found in previous studies by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey and Palfrey (2000), Levine
and Palfrey (2007) and Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2010); their estimated values for λ
are also high. Notice further that the λˆ values are comparatively lower for the voluntary and
costly (VC) mechanism, which intuitively makes sense as this mechanism entails the most
complicated game that subjects in our experiment were asked to play.21 This finding is also
consistent with the findings of the previous section, i.e., the data from the VC treatment
were found to be the furthest from the equilibrium predictions according to the estimates,
ηˆ. Finally, as in the equilibrium-plus-noise model, we again observe an improvement in λˆ as
we move from estimates based on the first 10 rounds of data to estimates based on the last
10 rounds of data under both the C and VC mechanisms. While λˆ decreases with experience
under the VN mechanism, from λˆ = 51.92 to 45.69, both estimates still indicate a high
degree of rationality; indeed, these estimates are higher than the λˆ estimates for the other
two treatments.
Consider next the QRE predictions regarding the voting decisions and participation rates.
Notice first that the QRE estimates for the frequency of sincere voting are lower for type-r
players than for type-b players under both voluntary mechanisms. This stands in contrast
to the Nash equilibrium prediction that both frequencies should be the same for both types.
21Subjects in the VC treatment have to process additional information concerning their private voting
cost and must condition their participation decision on that cost. Hence, one can argue that the cognitive
burden is higher under the VC mechanism.
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This reflects the pattern in our data that type-b players tend to vote “more sincerely” than
type-r players in these treatments. Second, the QRE estimates of participation rates are
again consistent with the comparative statics prediction of the theory. As in our experimental
data, the QRE predicts a higher participation rate for type-b players than for type-r players
under each voluntary mechanism, and a higher participation rate under the VN mechanism
than under VC mechanism for each type. Finally, the QRE predicts under-participation in
the VN mechanism and over-participation in VC mechanism, relative to the Nash equilibrium
predictions. However, our experimental data exhibit a strong tendency for over-participation
in all cases except for type-b players under the VN mechanism.22 This final observation
suggests that QRE does not do a very good job of predicting the participation rates observed
in our experimental data.
On the other hand, we again achieve very high likelihood ratio (LR) statistics for the
comparison between the unrestricted QRE model and the restricted model of random be-
havior (λ = 0). The degree of freedom is the same as before (d.f.=1), and hence, the LR
statistics reported in Table 13 exceeds to a high degree the critical value of the χ2 statis-
tic (=10.828) enabling us to reject at the 0.1% level, the null of no difference between the
restricted and unrestricted QRE models.
To further investigate the relationship between our data, the equilibrium predictions
and the two models of boundedly rational behavior, consider Figure 10 which illustrates the
sincerity of voting decisions under all three voting mechanisms and Figure 11 which illustrates
participation decisions under the two voluntary voting mechanisms. The circular dot in the
middle represents random play in which the subjects mix between their two available actions
(sincere/insincere voting or vote/abstain) with equal probability. The triangular dot in the
upper right corner (Figure 10), or on the uppermost line or on the middle left (Figure 11)
is the Nash equilibrium prediction. The straight line between these two dots corresponds to
the predictions from the equilibrium-plus-noise model for various values of η. As we change
the values of η from 0 to 1, we travel on the line from the point of random play toward the
Nash equilibrium. Similarly, the curved line between these same two points represents the
22Of course type-b players cannot over-participate in the VN treatment as the Nash prediction for their
participation rate is one.
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Figure 10: Data and Model Predictions Regarding the Sincere Voting Decisions, vs, in Each
Mechanism
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Figure 11: Data and Model Predictions Regarding Participation Decisions, ps, in the Two
Voluntary Voting Mechanisms
QRE predictions for various levels of λ. As we change the values of λ from 0 to∞, we move
from random play to the Nash equilibrium point. Finally, the square dot with the cross (
×) represents our data and the diamond dot on the QRE curve represents the maximum
likelihood estimate for the QRE prediction (labeled MQRE).
If we just look at the sincerity of voting decisions by signal type, Figure 10 suggests
that our data are pretty close to the Nash equilibrium predictions under all three voting
mechanisms. This can be anticipated from the high estimated values for ηˆ and λˆ in Tables
12 and 13. We conclude that Nash equilibrium performs very well in making quantitative
predictions of voting behavior. When we compare QRE with the equilibrium-plus-noise
model, it seems that our data are somewhat closer to the predictions of the latter model.
On the other hand, as Figure 11 reveals, our participation data exhibit deviations
from Nash equilibrium point predictions. For both voluntary voting mechanisms, over-
participation by one signal type was too great to be justified by using either the Nash or
QRE predictions. Specifically, in the VN treatment, type-r voters participated at rates
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greater than possible under any QRE parameter λ while in the VC treatment it was type-b
voters who over-participated relative to QRE predictions. In the VC treatment, type-r voters
also participated at a rate that is much higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction. These
findings suggest that neither Nash nor QRE may yield good point predictions for the partic-
ipation rates observed in our voluntary voting games. Nevertheless, as emphasized earlier,
we do find strong support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory both in the
data and in the estimated predictions using the two models of boundedly rational behavior.
3.7 LEARNING
Finally, it is of interest to consider whether there is any evidence of learning over the 20
repetitions of our voting games. In looking for evidence of learning, we compare the ob-
servations in the first 10 rounds with those in the last 10 rounds. Table 14 reports the
decomposition of both the voting and participation choice data into the two halves, and also
restates the Nash equilibrium predictions. Our data on voting and participation decisions
both indicate movement toward equilibrium predictions as subjects gained experience; voting
and participation decisions are always closer to Nash equilibrium predictions in the last 10
rounds as compared with the first 10 rounds, with the sole exception of voting behavior un-
der the VN treatment. However, the frequencies of sincere voting by type-r voters remained
largely the same between the two blocks of 10 rounds under the latter treatment. Hence the
only instance in which there is some deviation away from Nash equilibrium predictions by
experienced subjects is in the voting decisions of type-b players in the VN treatment.
Table 15 reports results from a signed ranks test examining whether there were any
significant differences in the sincerity of voting decisions or in participation rates for each
signal type between the first and the last 10 rounds. The results for voting behavior indicate
that the differences are largely insignificant. However, the results for participation decisions
indicate that there are significant learning effects on this dimension of voting behavior.
The evidence for learning in participation decisions is illustrated in Figure 12 which plots
the participation rates of the two signal types, ps, in the experimental data and relative to
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Sincere
Voting Red (vr)
a Blue (vb)
Cb- 1st 10 rounds 0.9022 (491)c 0.9782 (229)
C - 2nd 10 rounds 0.8900 (482) 0.9874 (238)
C Predicted 0.8440 1.0000
VN - 1st 10 rounds 0.9507 (345) 0.9825 (228)
VN - 2nd 10 rounds 0.9506 (324) 0.9593 (246)
VN Predicted 1.0000 1.0000
VC - 1st 10 rounds 0.9461 (204) 0.9514 (185)
VC - 2nd 10 rounds 0.9677 (186) 0.9740 (154)
VC Predicted 1.0000 1.0000
Participation
Rates Red (pr) Blue (pb)
VN - 1st 10 rounds 0.7263 (475) 0.9306 (245)
VN - 2nd 10 rounds 0.6998 (463) 0.9572 (257)
VN Predicted 0.5397 1.0000
VC - 1st 10 rounds 0.4397 (464) 0.7227 (256)
VC - 2nd 10 rounds 0.3788 (491) 0.6725 (229)
VC Predicted 0.2700 0.5497
a vs is the frequency of sincere voting, and ps is the partici-
pation rate, both by type-s.
b C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless,
VC=Voluntary & Costly.
c Number of observations is in parentheses.
Table 14: Evidence of Learning Over Time
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Sincere
Voting Red (type-r) Blue (type-b)
Ca positive 6, negative 4 positive 2, negative 8
0.3575b 0.1367
VN positive 5, negative 4 positive 9, negative 1
0.4264† 0.0721†
VC positive 1, negative 9 positive 2, negative 7
0.0721 0.1766
Participation
Rates Red (type-r) Blue (type-b)
VN positive 9, negative 1 positive 0, negative 10
0.0721 0.0340
VC positive 10, negative 0 positive 9, negative 1
0.0340 0.0721
a C=Compulsory, VN=Voluntary & Costless,
VC=Voluntary & Costly.
b All p-values are one-sided.
† Movement away from equilibrium predictions.
Table 15: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Learning
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Figure 12: Learning-Participation
model predictions. Here, Data 1 (the unfilled dot) represents the data (average from all
sessions of each voluntary treatment) from the first 10 rounds while Data 2 (the filled dot
with the ×), represents the data from the last 10 rounds. As Figure 12 reveals, there is
evidence of convergence toward the equilibrium from Data 1 to Data 2 under both voluntary
treatments. The size of the learning effect is especially large under the VC mechanism.
Since the game induced by the latter mechanism is rather complicated as reflected in the
relatively low estimated values for the QRE parameter λˆ, this evidence for learning in the
VC treatment suggests that equilibration may take longer than the time frame allowed (20
repetitions) by our experiment.
3.8 SUMMARY
Voting mechanisms are often evaluated in terms of their ability to aggregate private infor-
mation. As we have seen, in settings where voters have a common interest, rational choice
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theory predicts that voters will adopt mixed strategies that manifest themselves in different
ways depending on whether voting is compulsory or voluntary (abstention is allowed). Under
the compulsory, majority rule voting environment that we study, voters should play a mixed
strategy with respect to whether they vote sincerely (according to their signal) when they
receive an r signal, though they should always vote sincerely conditional on receiving the
other b signal. Under the voluntary majority rule voting environment we study, voters should
always vote sincerely, according to the signal they receive but they should play a mixed strat-
egy with respect to their participation decision to vote or to abstain. We have designed the
first ever experiment aimed at comparing these two different voting mechanisms and testing
this important difference in the type of mixed strategy that rational players should adopt
and we have found compelling evidence that voters do indeed adapt their behavior to the
institutional voting mechanism that is in place in the manner predicted by theory. In partic-
ular, we find that signal type-r voters vote significantly more insincerely than signal type-b
voters under the compulsory voting mechanism as well as by comparison with either signal
type voters under both voluntary voting mechanisms. As for the voluntary voting mecha-
nism, we find significant variations in voter participation rates, but sincere voting among
those choosing to vote, all as predicted by the theory. We also observe that the differences
in the efficiency of the three voting mechanisms in terms of generating the correct outcome
are theoretically small. Under our parameterization of the voting model we predict and find
that efficiency is highest on average under the voluntary and costless voting mechanism,
followed by the compulsory voting model and that efficiency is lowest on average under the
voluntary and costly mechanism. However, we do not find that these efficiency difference
are statistically significant using our experimental data.
Taken together these findings help us to understand why both compulsory and voluntary
voting mechanisms are observed to co-exist in nature, a question that we posed at the
beginning of this chapter. The two institutions coexist because the informational efficiency
differences between them are not very great and, most importantly, because voters can and
do adapt their behavior to the institutional voting rules that have been put in place in a
way that preserves full information aggregation.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In the preceding two chapters, I considered the implications of rational voting and strategic
choices either in elections or in committee decision-making. An interesting question related
to the experimental study of the third chapter is how to optimally design voting mechanisms
in the jury trail model in which voters must decide whether to acquire costly information
about the true state of nature, in addition to making a (compulsory) voting decision. In
this case, a voting mechanism, by definition, consists of a group size and a voting rule.
The optimal voting mechanism is the one that maximizes the probability of group’s making
a correct decision (the efficiency of the group’s decision). The optimality of a group size
or a voting rule crucially depends on whether information is freely given, as in the voting
environment studied in the third chapter, or is acquired at a (fixed) cost. We can consider
which voting mechanism performs better in the sense of yielding the correct group decision
under costless and costly information, and investigate whether simple theoretical models of
voting games with alternative information structures can give us predictions that are useful
to explaining laboratory data.
The basic setup is again the Condorcet jury model in which voters must make a decision as
a group about whether to convict or acquit the accused, based on private noisy signals about
whether the latter is guilty or innocent. When the signals are free information to the voters,
they can do better - make a correct decision with a higher probability - with a larger group
size. This is the standard information aggregation effect or a prediction of the celebrated
Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet 1785). Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) have shown
that this result is robust to strategic voting. Even if people vote strategically against their
signals, they do it in an optimal way, and as a consequence, we obtain information aggregation
with increasing group size. An implication for the optimal voting mechanism is that we can
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always make the voting mechanism better by adding more voters when private signals are
freely provided.
However, this is no longer the case when information is endogenous and its acquisition
involves a costly decision. If people are asked to buy private signals at a fixed cost to be
better informed about the true state, there is an important free-riding consideration that
counterbalances the information aggregation effect mentioned above. As we add one more
voter to a group, and as long as this voter still has an incentive to acquire information
(with positive probability), the information aggregation effect implies a higher probability
of making a correct group decision (a positive effect on the efficiency of group decision). On
the other hand, the entire group of voters are less likely to acquire information as we add
one more voter. Hence, the free-riding consideration entails a negative effect on efficiency.
As we increase the group size with any fixed voting rule, the information aggregation effect
is dominant at first and hence we have an increase in the efficiency of group decision up to a
certain group size. Beyond this group size, the free-riding effect is dominant, resulting in a
decrease in efficiency. Persico (2004) is the first study that establishes results about optimal
voting mechanisms that are similar under the Condorcet Jury setup.
This gives us the first hypothesis that is testable against experimental data. For a fixed
(majority) voting rule, we will increase the group size from, for instance, five to seven. Then
we should observe an increase in efficiency when information is free while we should have a
significant drop in efficiency when information is costly, under a suitable choice of parameter
values. This results from a large fall in the frequency of information acquisition, which we
also expect to see in our data. This broadly tests the hypothesis that the optimal group
size is bounded from above with endogenous information (while it’s unbounded with free
information). In other words, the theory puts an upper bound on the optimal group size,
and we examine whether this bound really works among laboratory subjects who are asked
to make a decision about the purchase of costly information.
Endogeneity of information also has an implication about (sincere) voting behavior.
When information is free and exogenous, voters have incentives to vote strategically against
their signals, for instance, with the asymmetry in the precision of signals, along the line of
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). Under a broad range of parameter setups, voters of one
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signal type are predicted to vote against their private signals with positive probability (while
voters of the other signal type are predicted to vote sincerely according to their signals).1
This is in line with the mixed-strategy equilibrium of strategic voting game in Feddersen and
Pesendofer (1998). However, when information is costly and endogenous, voters no longer
have an incentive to vote strategically upon acquiring costly information. In other words,
once voters decide to buy a costly signal, they will always vote according to their acquired
signals.2
Similar tests about sincere voting behavior have been done in the previous chapter under
the framework of compulsory versus voluntary voting. The compulsory voting game studied
before is exactly the same as the voting game with free information in the present framework,
and as such, induces a strategic (insincere) voting equilibrium. However, the voluntary voting
game induces a sincere voting equilibrium (Krishna and Morgan 2010) in which all those who
participate in voting, vote sincerely according to their signals (or abstain). As in the previous
chapter, we test whether people properly adjust their (sincere) voting behavior as we change
our voting institution from the one with free information to that with costly information.
The final consideration concerns the optimal voting rule. The maintained assumption is
asymmetric precision of signals. In this case, for instance, the guilty signal is more precise at
the guilty state than the innocent signal is at the innocent state, and hence, if we employed
majority rule, then we would convict the subject more often than is desired. Therefore,
majority rule cannot be the optimal voting rule no matter whether information is costly
or not. If every voter gets a private signal for free (free information), then the voting rule
may entail a relatively small difference in the efficiency of group decision. We obtain more
interesting comparative statics predictions when information is endogenous and costly. Let’s
fix the group size. If we set the fixed cost of information large enough so that voters have
no incentive to acquire it under majority rule, but small enough so that they do have an
incentive to acquire it under the optimal rule, then the voting rule can make a great difference
1Which type will vote strategically or sincerely depends on the conditional probabilities with which the
signals are realized and voting rules. For any group size, there exists a voting rule - a supermajority rule -
under which both types vote sincerely in equilibrium.
2 In typical mixed strategy equilibria of voting games with endogenous information, voters don’t acquire
information with positive probability, and they may randomize over the alternatives, not necessarily with
equal probability especially when the voting rule itself is asymmetric (e.g. supermajority rule), upon not
acquiring information.
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in terms of efficiency. If no one acquire information, then the efficiency stays at 0.5 (with
the assumption of an equal prior); however, when there is positive information acquisition,
the group can do much better than a mere random decision.
Thus our final test is to see whether the voting rule alone is able to induce information
acquisition large enough to make a significant difference in efficiency when other parameters
of the voting environment are kept constant. We again compare the efficiency of voting
mechanisms with free and costly information under the alternate voting rules and try to
confirm whether the predicted role of the voting rule is relevant in explaining our laboratory
data. The proposed experimental tests will shed light on how to design optimal voting
mechanism - how to adjust the group size and the voting rule to achieve higher efficiency
in group decisions - especially when the assumption of costly information acquisition is
appropriate among voters with common preferences who are making a collective decision.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
This section collects the proofs for Chapter 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. (1) It follows directly from A3 that y∗A ≤ y∗B.
If a < pA < pB < b, then αA ≥ F (pA) > 0 and αB ≥ 1 − F (pB) > 0 as F is atomless.
Hence, c(d, αA) > 0 and c(d, αB) > 0, implying y
∗
B < pB and y
∗
A > pA. If a = pA < pB < b,
then again, αB ≥ 1 − F (pB) > 0 implies y∗A > pA. But this implies αA ≥ F (y∗A) > 0, so
y∗B < pB. The case a < pA < pB = b is similar. Finally, if a = pA < pB = b, we cannot
have y∗A = pA and y
∗
B = pB at the same time since the latter fact would imply αA = αB = 0
- a contradiction. Thus, we must have, say, y∗A > pA, but then, by the above argument, it
follows y∗B < pB.
(2) Suppose pA is closer to the median than pB. Then, by A4, c(d, αA) > c(d, αB), so by
A2, αA > αB. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. This is a consequence of the Implicit Function Theorem(IFT). The
bargaining outcomes constitute a system of equations that possibly define the outcomes as
implicit functions of the platforms:
F1(y
∗
A, y
∗
B; pA, pB) ≡ y∗A − pA − c(pB − pA, 1− F
(y∗A + y∗B
2
)
) = 0
F2(y
∗
A, y
∗
B; pA, pB) ≡ y∗B − pB + c(pB − pA, F
(y∗A + y∗B
2
)
) = 0
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Both F1, F2 are C
1 functions as we assume that c(·, ·) is a C1 function. If pA < pB, then
since cα > 0,
det
∂(F1, F2)
∂(y∗A, y
∗
B)
= 1 +
f(y∗M)
2
[cα(d, αA) + cα(d, αB)] > 0
where y∗M ≡ y
∗
A+y
∗
B
2
. Hence, there exist C1 functions fA, fB such that y
∗
A = fA(pA, pB) and
y∗B = fB(pA, pB). 2
Proof of Lemma 3. Since F is atomless, it suffices to check whether (y∗A+y
∗
B)(p) is strictly
increasing in pj, j = A,B. IFT also tells us how the bargaining outcomes change according
to the changes in the platforms;
∂y∗A
∂pA
=
1− cd(d, αB) + f(y
∗
M )
2 [cα(d, αA)− cd(d, αA)cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αB)cα(d, αA)]
1 +
f(y∗M )
2 [cα(d, αA) + cα(d, αB)]
∂y∗A
∂pB
=
cd(d, αB)− f(y
∗
M )
2 [cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αA)cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αB)cα(d, αA)]
1 +
f(y∗M )
2 [cα(d, αA) + cα(d, αB)]
∂y∗B
∂pA
=
cd(d, αA)− f(y
∗
M )
2 [cα(d, αA)− cd(d, αA)cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αB)cα(d, αA)]
1 +
f(y∗M )
2 [cα(d, αA) + cα(d, αB)]
∂y∗B
∂pB
=
1− cd(d, αA) + f(y
∗
M )
2 [cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αA)cα(d, αB)− cd(d, αB)cα(d, αA)]
1 +
f(y∗M )
2 [cα(d, αA) + cα(d, αB)]
where y∗M ≡ y
∗
A+y
∗
B
2
. If αA = αB =
1
2
, then y∗M = m and the above expressions for the partial
derivatives of the outcomes imply, for j = A,B,
∂(y∗A + y
∗
B)
∂pj
=
1
1 + f(m)cα(d,
1
2
)
> 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
(1) Let (p¯A, p¯B) be a symmetric strategy profile. Note that
c(d(p¯),
1
2
) =
d(p¯)
2
⇔ y¯∗A = y¯∗B = m.
Suppose (toward a contradiction) that c(d(p¯), 1
2
) < d(p¯)
2
so that y¯∗A < m < y¯
∗
B. In this
case, the parties win with equal probability and the final outcome is still y¯∗ = y¯
∗
A+y¯
∗
B
2
= m.
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By Lemma 2, αA ≡ F
(
y∗A+y
∗
B
2
)
is strictly increasing in pA at the symmetric profile (p¯A, p¯B).
Since y∗A is a C
1 function of (pA, pB), there exists a platform p˜A > p¯A such that y˜
∗
A < m and
α˜A ≡ F
( y˜∗A + y˜∗B
2
)
>
1
2
= F
( y¯∗A + y¯∗B
2
)
≡ α¯A.
Thus, as is depicted in Figure 4, A wins for sure and the final outcome is y˜∗ = y˜∗A < m,
which means p˜A is a profitable deviation for A, given p¯B. 2
(2) Since we must have c(d(p¯), αj(p¯) =
1
2
) = d(p¯)
2
= d(p¯)αj(p¯) at any symmetric equilibrium
p¯, it follows cd(d(p¯), αj(p¯)) =
1
2
and cα(d(p¯), αj(p¯)) = d(p¯). But then, the bargaining
outcomes are all strictly increasing in the platforms:
∂y∗A
∂pA
(p¯) =
∂y∗A
∂pB
(p¯) =
∂y∗B
∂pA
(p¯) =
∂y∗B
∂pB
(p¯) =
1
2 + 2f(m)d(p¯)
> 0.
Suppose a < p¯A < p¯B < b; (1) implies y¯
∗
A = y¯
∗
B = m. As pA decreases, both y
∗
A, y
∗
B
also decrease. Thus, strict monotonicity of the outcomes at p¯ ensures that any infinitesimal
deviation p˜A < p¯A is profitable for A since
α˜A ≡ F
( y˜∗A + y˜∗B
2
)
< F (m) =
1
2
but y˜∗ = y˜∗B < m.
The profitability of A’s deviation is illustrated in Figure 5. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. Given pB = b, pA ≥ m cannot be a profitable deviation from
a; similarly, pB ≤ m is also ruled out. It suffices to note that the above conditions are
equivalent to
y∗A(pA, b) = pA + c(d(pA, b), αB(pA, b)) ≥ m, ∀pA ∈ [a,m),
y∗B(a, pB) = pB − c(d(a, pB), αA(a, pB)) ≤ m, ∀pB ∈ (m, b].
which makes any deviations unprofitable. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. For the case of symmetric equilibria (where
y∗A+y
∗
B
2
= m by
definition), we must have y∗ = y∗A = y
∗
B = m by Proposition 2.
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Let (pA, pB) be an equilibrium with pA < m < pB but suppose it is not symmetric.
We first show y∗A < m < y
∗
B cannot occur at (pA, pB). We can have either
y∗A+y
∗
B
2
< m or
y∗A+y
∗
B
2
> m, but then p˜A = 2m− pB or p˜B = 2m− pA is a profitable deviation. The reason
is that it makes (p˜A, pB) or (pA, p˜B) symmetric.
If m < y∗A ≤ y∗B or y∗A ≤ y∗B < m, then the parties prefer making a tie to winning, so
again, p˜A = 2m− pB or p˜B = 2m− pA becomes a profitable deviation.
Thus, for the given equilibrium (pA, pB) that is not symmetric, we end up with two
possibilities
y∗A < m = y
∗
B or y
∗
A = m < y
∗
B.
In any of these cases, the final bargaining outcome is y∗ = m. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.
The arguments are similar to the ones given for payoff discontinuity. First, fix a < p < m.
Then, as (pA, pB) converges to (p, 2m− p) from below, the winning platform is pB; while as
(pA, pB) converges to (p, 2m− p) from above, the winning platform is pA. Thus,
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wA(pA, pB)
= lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
vA(pB − c(pB − pA, αA)) = vA(mu)
where mu ≡ 2m− p− c(2m− 2p, 12) > m; and
lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wA(pA, pB)
= lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
vA(pA + c(pB − pA, αB)) = vA(ml)
where ml ≡ p + c(2m − 2p, 12) < m. However, wA(p, 2m − p) = vA(m), hence A’s utility is
monotonic for a < p < m since vA(mu) < vA(m) < vA(ml).
Similarly,
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lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wB(pA, pB) = vB(mu) > wB(p, 2m− p) = vB(m)
> vB(ml) = lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wB(pA, pB).
Thus B’s utility is also monotonic and compensates the monotonicity of A’s utility.
Next, if we fix m < p < b, then the winner is A as the convergence is from below while
it is B as the convergence is from above. Hence,
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wA(pA, pB) = vA(p) < vA(m)
< vA(2m− p) = lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wA(pA, pB)
and
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wB(pA, pB) = vB(p) > vB(m)
> vB(2m− p) = lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wB(pA, pB).
Therefore, in any cases, we’ve seen that the last assumption of Dasgupta and Maskin (The-
orem 5b) holds. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.
For each p ∈ (a,m) ∪ (m, b), choose w¯A(p), w¯B(p) s.t.
lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
wA(pA, pB) > w¯A(p) > wA(p, 2m− p) (A.1)
lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
wB(pA, pB) > w¯B(p) > wB(p, 2m− p) (A.2)
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and
w¯A(p) + w¯B(p) ≥ lim
pA→p−,pB→(2m−p)−
[wA(pA, pB) + wB(pA, pB)]
w¯A(p) + w¯B(p) ≥ lim
pA→p+,pB→(2m−p)+
[wA(pA, pB) + wB(pA, pB)]
(A.3)
Define
wˆA(p, 2m− p) = w¯A(p) (A.4)
wˆB(p, 2m− p) = w¯B(p) (A.5)
For (pA, pB) 6= (p, 2m− p) or (pA, pB) ∈ {(m,m), (a, b), (b, a)}, define
wˆA(pA, pB) ≡ wA(pA, pB), wˆB(pA, pB) ≡ wB(pA, pB).
Since wA, wB are continuous except for (pA, pB) = (p, 2m− p), p 6= m, a, b, wˆA + wˆB is also
continuous there.
By (3),(4) and (5), wˆA + wˆB is upper semicontinuous at points (p, 2m− p), p 6= m, a, b.
From (1) and (4), wˆA is weakly lower semicontinuous at (p, 2m− p) and from (2) and (5), so
is wˆB. Hence, the game [(Sj, wˆj); j = A,B] possesses a mixed strategy equilibrium (µˆA, µˆB)
by Dasgupta and Maskin’s Theorem 5.
It remains to show that (µˆA, µˆB) is an equilibrium of the original game [(Sj, wj); j =
A,B]. Choose pˆ ∈ supp(µˆA). Then
∫
wˆA(pˆ, pB)dµˆB ≥
∫
wˆA(pA, pB)dµˆB, ∀pA (A.6)
If µˆB(2m − pˆ) > 0 and if wA is discontinuous at (pˆ, 2m − pˆ), then from (1) and (4), there
exists a platform p′ close to pˆ s.t.
∫
wˆA(p
′, pB)dµˆB >
∫
wˆA(pˆ, pB)dµˆB, a contradiction of (6).
Hence,
∫
wˆA(pˆ, pB)dµˆB =
∫
wA(pˆ, pB)dµˆB (A.7)
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But from (1) and (4), wˆA(pA, pB) ≥ wA(pA, pB) for all (pA, pB); hence
∫
wˆA(pA, pB)dµˆB ≥
∫
wA(pA, pB)dµˆB (A.8)
Combining (6)-(8),
∫
wA(pˆ, pB)dµˆB ≥
∫
wA(pA, pB)dµˆB, ∀pA; i.e. µˆA is a best response to
µˆB. Similarly, µˆB is a best response to µˆA. 2
Proof of Lemma 5. We define a linear integral operator Φ : C[2m − β, 2m − α] →
C[2m− β, 2m− α] by
Φg(x) ≡ λˆ(x)−1
∫ x
2m−β
v′A(yˆ
∗
B(x, t))
∂yˆ∗B
∂pA
(x, t)g(t)dt
+ λˆ(x)−1
∫ 2m−α
x
v′A(yˆ
∗
A(x, t))
∂yˆ∗A
∂pA
(x, t)g(t)dt
If the linear map Φ has a fixed point, then it must be a solution to our integral equation.
Since vA, vB, y
∗
A, y
∗
B are all C
1 functions, we can find some constants ξA, ξB s.t.
∣∣∣v′A(yˆ∗A(x, t))∂yˆ∗A∂pA (x, t)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣v′A(y∗A(pA, pB))∂y∗A∂pA (pA, pB)
∣∣∣ ≤ ξA, ∀(pA, pB) ∈ RA,∣∣∣v′A(yˆ∗B(x, t))∂yˆ∗B∂pA (x, t)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣v′A(y∗B(pA, pB))∂y∗B∂pA (pA, pB)
∣∣∣ ≤ ξB, ∀(pA, pB) ∈ RB.
where RA ≡ {(pA, pB) : α ≤ pA ≤ β, 2m− pA ≤ pB ≤ 2m− α}
RB ≡ {(pA, pB) : α ≤ pA ≤ β, 2m− β ≤ pB ≤ 2m− pA}
Then, ∀g, h ∈ C[2m− β, 2m− α],
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∣∣∣Φg(x)− Φh(x)∣∣∣
= |λˆ(x)|−1
∣∣∣ ∫ x
2m−β
v′A(yˆ
∗
B(x, t))
∂yˆ∗B
∂pA
(x, t)[g(t)− h(t)]dt
+
∫ 2m−α
x
v′A(yˆ
∗
A(x, t))
∂yˆ∗A
∂pA
(x, t)[g(t)− h(t)]dt
∣∣∣
≤ |λˆ(x)|−1
(
ξB max
s∈[2m−β,2m−α]
|g(s)− h(s)|
∫ x
2m−β
dt
+ ξA max
s∈[2m−β,2m−α]
|g(s)− h(s)|
∫ 2m−α
x
dt
)
≤ |λˆ(x)|−1ξ(β − α)d(g, h),
where ξ ≡ max{ξA, ξB}. Taking the maximum on the left-hand side,
d(Φg,Φh) ≤ ξ(β − α)|λˆ(x)| d(g, h) =
ξ(β − α)
|λ(pA)| d(g, h).
Hence, Φ is a contraction if
ξ(β − α) < |λ(pA)|
and we then apply the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to have a unique solution g for the
original integral equation.
We can proceed similarly with party B’s payoff VB(pB) to get
ζ(β − α) < |µ(pB)|, ∀pB ∈ [2m− β, 2m− α]
where ζ ≡ max{ζA, ζB},
∣∣∣v′B(y∗A(pA, pB))∂y∗A∂pB (pA, pB)
∣∣∣ ≤ ζA, ∀(pA, pB) ∈ RA,∣∣∣v′B(y∗B(pA, pB))∂y∗B∂pB (pA, pB)
∣∣∣ ≤ ζB, ∀(pA, pB) ∈ RB
and
µ(pB) ≡ vB(y∗B(2m− pB, pB))− vB(y∗A(2m− pB, pB)). 2
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APPENDIX B
EQUILIBRIUM CALCULATIONS FOR CHAPTER 3
In deriving equilibrium predictions, we adopt the parameterization of our experimental design
where the number of voters N = 9, xρ = Pr[r|ρ] = 0.9 and xβ = Pr[b|β] = 0.6. These choices
imply that q(ρ|r) = 9
13
and q(β|b) = 6
7
.
Consider first the compulsory voting mechanism (C). Let vs denote the probability of
voting sincerely given signal s ∈ {r, b}. A symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium is described
by a strategy profile (vr, vs).
We begin by calculating the probability of pivotal events Pr[Piv|ω]. Suppose the prob-
ability of a randomly chosen voter voting for alternative A in state ω is denoted by A(ω).
Then,
R(ρ) = 0.9vr + 0.1(1− vb),
B(β) = 0.6vb + 0.4(1− vr).
Since only signal type-r mixes (vr ∈ (0, 1)) while type-b plays a pure strategy of voting
sincerely in our equilibrium, these expressions can be further simplified to R(ρ) = 0.9vr and
B(β) = 0.6 + 0.4(1 − vr), i.e., the compulsory voting equilibrium is identified with a single
number, vr.
Let (j, k) denote the event that there are j votes for R and k votes for B. Under compul-
sory voting, the only pivotal event is (4, 4), where a vote for either R or B is pivotal. The
99
pivot probability in each state is given by
Pr[Piv|ρ] = Pr[(4, 4)|ρ] = (8
4
)
[R(ρ)]4[1−R(ρ)]4,
Pr[Piv|β] = Pr[(4, 4)|β] = (8
4
)
[B(β)]4[1−B(β)]4.
Using these expressions for the pivot probabilities, we can calculate type-r’s choice probability
vr ∈ (0, 1) by solving the following equation:
U(R|r)− U(B|r) = 0⇒ 9
13
Pr[Piv|ρ]− 4
13
Pr[Piv|β] = 0.
The equilibrium choice probability for type-r is vr = 0.8440 which results in
U(B|b)− U(R|b) = M
[
6
7
Pr[Piv|β]− 1
7
Pr[Piv|ρ]
]
= M · 0.1389 > 0,
and this justifies type-b’s choice of sincere voting, i.e., vb = 1.
Consider next the voluntary and costless voting mechanism (VN). We focus here on
the symmetric sincere voting equilibrium under this voting mechanism. Since we allow
abstention, the event that a vote for R is pivotal may no longer coincide with the event that
a vote for B is pivotal. Let us denote the former event by PivR and the latter event by PivB.
We again need to calculate the pivot probabilities Pr[Pivj|ω], j = R,B.
As mentioned in footnote 10 if we denote by T , T−1, and T+1 the events that the number
of votes for R is the same as, one less than, and one more than the number of votes for B,
respectively, then for each ω ∈ {ρ, β},
Pr[PivR|ω] = Pr[T |ω] + Pr[T−1|ω],
Pr[PivB|ω] = Pr[T |ω] + Pr[T+1|ω],
where
T ≡ {(k, k) : 0 ≤ k ≤ 4},
T−1 ≡ {(k − 1, k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ 4},
T+1 ≡ {(k, k − 1) : 1 ≤ k ≤ 4}.
Next, let pr and pb denote the participation rates of type-r and type-b voters respectively.
Since we have a sincere voting equilibrium under the two voluntary mechanisms, a symmetric
100
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is described by a pair of participation rates (pr, pb). A(ω) is
analogously defined as the probability of a randomly chosen voter choosing alternative A ∈
{R,B, φ} in state ω ∈ {ρ, β}. Assuming sincere voting, we have:
R(ρ) = 0.9pr, B(ρ) = 0.1pb, φ(ρ) = 1−R(ρ)−B(ρ),
R(β) = 0.4pr, B(β) = 0.6pb, φ(β) = 1−R(β)−B(β).
Under voluntary and costless voting (VN), type-r mixes between (sincere) voting and ab-
staining (pr ∈ (0, 1)) while type-b votes for certain (pb = 1), hence R(ρ) = 0.9pr, B(ρ) = 0.1,
R(β) = 0.4pr and B(β) = 0.6 (the voluntary and costless voting equilibrium is again identi-
fied with a single number, pr). Using the expressions for A(ω), we can write
Pr[T |ω] =
4∑
k=0
(
n
2k
)(
2k
k
)
R(ω)kB(ω)k(1−R(ω)−B(ω))n−2k,
Pr[T−1|ω] =
4∑
k=1
(
n
2k − 1
)(
2k − 1
k − 1
)
R(ω)k−1B(ω)k(1−R(ω)−B(ω))n−2k+1,
Pr[T+1|ω] =
4∑
k=1
(
n
2k − 1
)(
2k − 1
k
)
R(ω)kB(ω)k−1(1−R(ω)−B(ω))n−2k+1.
We now know how to express Pr[Pivj|ω] as a function of pr. Type-r’s equilibrium participa-
tion rate can then be obtained from
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) = 0⇒ 9
13
Pr[PivR|ρ]− 4
13
Pr[PivR|β] = 0,
which yields pr = 0.5387 and results in
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) = M
[
6
7
Pr[PivB|β]− 1
7
Pr[PivB|ρ]
]
= M · (0.0342) > 0.
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The latter condition again justifies type-b’s full participation in voting (pb = 1). Using
the above solution for pr, we can check that sincere voting is in fact incentive compatible.
Specifically, we have:
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) = 0,
U(B|r)− U(φ|r) = M
[
4
13
Pr[PivB|β]− 9
13
Pr[PivB|ρ]
]
= M · (−0.0402) < 0
⇒ U(R|r) > U(B|r).
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) = M · (0.0342) > 0.
U(R|b)− U(φ|b) = M
[
1
7
Pr[PivR|ρ]− 6
7
Pr[PivR|β]
]
= M · (−0.0693) < 0
⇒ U(B|b) > U(R|b).
The final case of voluntary and costly voting (VC) is similar. We again have a sincere
voting equilibrium and the expressions for A(ω) and the pivot probabilities Pr[Pivj|ω] are the
same as those for the voluntary and costless voting case (VN) except that both participation
rates for type-r and type-b voters are now less than 1; i.e., pr, pb ∈ (0, 1) (this means that the
pivot probabilities Pr[Pivj|ω] are functions of both pr and pb). In the case of voluntary and
costly voting, we have a cutoff-cost equilibrium with the cutoffs given by F−1(pr), F−1(pb),
where F is the distribution of voting costs. In other words, a type-s voter participates in
voting if and only if her realized voting cost is below F−1(ps), s = r,b. A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is defined as a pair (pr, pb) that solves
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) ≡ M
[
9
13
Pr[PivR|ρ]− 4
13
Pr[PivR|β]
]
= F−1(pr),
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) ≡ M
[
6
7
Pr[PivB|β]− 1
7
Pr[PivB|ρ]
]
= F−1(pb).
If F is the uniform distribution with the support [0, M
10
] as in our laboratory voting games,
the resulting solutions are pr = 0.2700, pb = 0.5497 as reported in the text. These values
again insure that sincere voting is incentive compatible. Specifically, we have:
U(R|r)− U(φ|r) = M · (0.0270) > M · (−0.1188) = U(B|r)− U(φ|r)
U(B|b)− U(φ|b) = M · (0.0550) > M · (−0.1277) = U(R|b)− U(φ|b)
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 3
The following are the experimental instructions for the voluntary and costly voting (VC)
treatment. The instructions for the other two treatments are similar, with the omission of
the voting cost part for the voluntary and costless treatment and the further omission of the
participation decision part for the compulsory and costless treatment. The complete set of
instructions for all three treatments is available at http://www.pitt.edu/ jduffy/voting/
C.1 OVERVIEW
Welcome to this experiment in the economics of decision-making. Funding for this experi-
ment has been provided by the University of Pittsburgh. We ask that you not talk with one
another for the duration of the experiment.
For your participation in today’s session you will be paid in cash, at the end of the ex-
periment. Different participants may earn different amounts. The amount you earn depends
partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. Thus it is
important that you listen carefully and fully understand the instructions before we begin.
There will be a short comprehension quiz following the reading of these instructions which
you will all need to complete before we can begin the experimental session.
The experiment will make use of the computer workstations, and all interaction among
you will take place through these computers. You will interact anonymously with one another
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and your data records will be stored only by your ID number; your name or the names of
other participants will not be revealed in the session today or in any write-up of the findings
from this experiment.
Today’s session will involve 18 subjects and 20 rounds of a decision-making task. In each
round you will view some information and make a decision. Your decision together with the
decisions of others determine the amount of points you earn each round. Your dollar earnings
are determined by multiplying your total points from all 20 rounds by a conversion rate. In
this experiment, each point is worth 1 cent, so 100 points = $1.00. Following completion
of the 20th round, you will be paid your total dollar earnings plus a show-up fee of $5.00.
Everyone will be paid in private, and you are under no obligation to tell others how much
you earned.
C.2 SPECIFIC DETAILS
At the start of each and every round, you will be randomly assigned to one of two groups, the
R (Red) group or the B (Blue) group. Each group will consist of 9 members. All assignments
of the 18 subjects to the two groups of size 9 at the start of each round are equally likely.
Neither you nor any other member of your group or the other group will be informed of
whether they are assigned to the R or to the B groups until the end of the round.
Imagine that there are two ”jars”, which we call the red jar and the blue jar. Each jar
contains 10 balls; the red jar contains 9 red balls and 1 blue ball while the blue jar contains 6
blue balls and 4 red balls. The red jar is always assigned to the R (Red) group and the blue
jar is always assigned to the B (Blue) group. However, recall that you do not know which
group (Red or Blue) you have been assigned to; that is, you don’t know the true color of
your group’s jar. Furthermore, your assignment to the R or B group is randomly determined
at the start of every round.
To help you determine which jar is assigned to your group, each member of your group
will be allowed to independently select one ball, at random, from your group’s jar. You
do this on the first stage screen on your computer by clicking on your choice of the ball to
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examine: the balls are numbered 1 to 10. Once you click on the number of a ball, you will be
privately informed of the color of that ball. You will not be told the color of the balls drawn
by the other members of your group, nor will they learn the color of the ball you chose, and
it is possible for members of your group to draw the same ball as you do or any of the other
9 balls as well. Each member in your group selects one ball on their own, and only sees the
color of their own ball. However, all members of your group (Red or Blue) will choose a ball
from the same jar that contains the same number of red and blue balls. Recall again that if
you are choosing a ball from the red jar, that jar contains 9 red balls and 1 blue ball while
if you are choosing a ball from the blue jar, that jar contains 6 blue balls and 4 red balls.
After each individual has drawn a ball and observed the color of their chosen ball, each
individual is asked to decide (1) whether they want to join in the group decision process and
make a choice between “RED” or “BLUE” or (2) whether they do not want to join in the
group decision process, corresponding to the option “NO CHOICE”.
Your group’s decision depends on both individual decisions.
Your 9-member group’s decision will be the color chosen by the majority of those who
decided to join the group decision process. Suppose for example that 6 of your group members
decided to join the group decision process (i.e., 3 members selected NO CHOICE). If 4 or
more of the 6 who decided to make a choice choose RED, then the group decision is RED by
the majority rule. Similarly, the group’s decision is BLUE if a majority of those who decided
to make a choice chose BLUE. That is, your group’s decision will be whichever color receives
more individual choices among the members of your group who decided to make a choice. In
the case of a tie, where each color receives the same number of individual choices by members
of your group (for example, 3 members chose RED and the other 3 chose BLUE), the group
decision is INDETERMINATE. If the number of those who decided to make a choice is odd
(for example, 5 members decided to make a choice while 4 members selected NO CHOICE),
then your group’s decision can be either CORRECT or INCORRECT, as discussed below,
but it cannot be INDETERMINATE.
If you decided not to join the group decision process, that is, you selected NO CHOICE,
then you will get additional points, which we refer to as the NC BONUS. The amount of
your NC BONUS is assigned randomly by the computer. In any given round, your NC bonus
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points for the round will be a number drawn randomly from the set {0, 1, 2, ..10}, with all
numbers in that set being equally likely. Your NC BONUS in each round does not depend
on your prior round NC BONUS or your decisions in any previous rounds, or on the NC
BONUSes or decisions of other members. While you are told your own NC BONUS before
you make any decision, you are never told the NC BONUSes of other participants. You only
know that each of the other members has an NC BONUS that is some number between 0
and 10, inclusive.
The points you earn in any given round are determined as follows. Suppose you decided
to join the group decision process and you then chose RED or BLUE. If your group’s decision
(via majority rule) is the same as the true color of the jar that is assigned to your group,
then the group decision is CORRECT, and you will earn 100 points from the group’s correct
decision. If your group’s decision is different from the true color of your group’s jar, then
the group decision is INCORRECT, and you will earn 0 points from the group’s incorrect
decision. If the group decision is INDETERMINATE, then you will earn 50 points from the
group’s indeterminate decision. Suppose instead that you selected NO CHOICE. In that
case, if your group’s decision is the same as the true color of the jar that is assigned to your
group, then the group decision is CORRECT, and you will earn 100 points plus the NC
BONUS assigned to you for that round. If your group’s decision is different from the true
color of your group’s jar, then the group decision is INCORRECT, and you will earn the
NC BONUS. If your group’s decision is INDETERMINATE, then you will earn 50 points
plus the NC BONUS. In other words, if you decide not to join the group decision-you select
NO CHOICE-then your earnings will increase by the amount of the NC BONUS that is
assigned to you in each round. Notice that both decisions, your decision to make a choice
or not (NO CHOICE) and, if you decide to make a choice, your decision between RED or
BLUE can affect whether the overall decision of your group is CORRECT, INCORRECT
or INDETERMINATE.
If the final (20th) round has not yet been played, then at the start of each new round you
and all of the other participants will be randomly assigned to a new 9-person group, R or
B. You will not know which group, R or B you have been assigned to but you will have the
opportunity to draw a new ball from your group’s jar, to decide whether to make a choice
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or not (NO CHOICE) and if you have decided to make a choice to choose between RED or
BLUE. In other words, the group you are in will change from round to round.
Following completion of the final round, your points earned from all rounds played will
be converted into cash at the rate of 1 point = 1 cent. You will be paid these total earnings
together with your $5 show-up payment in cash and in private.
C.3 QUESTIONS?
Now is the time for questions. If you have a question about any aspect of these instructions,
please raise your hand and an experimenter will answer your question in private.
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APPENDIX D
QUIZ FOR CHAPTER 3
Before we start today’s experiment we ask you to answer the following quiz questions that
are intended to check your comprehension of the instructions. The numbers in these quiz
questions are illustrative; the actual numbers in the experiment may be quite different.
Before starting the experiment we will review each participant’s answers. If there are any
incorrect answers we will go over the relevant part of the instructions again.
1. I will be assigned to the same group, R or B in every round. Circle one: True
False.
2. I will get a different NC Bonus in every round. Circle one: True False.
3. If I decide to make a choice I give up the NC Bonus Circle one: True False.
4. The red jar contains red balls and blue balls. The blue jar contains red
balls and blue balls.
5. Consider the following scenario in a round. 5 members of your group decide to make a
choice and 3 of these members choose RED.
a. How many members of your group made NO CHOICE?
b. What is your group’s decision?
c. If the jar of balls your group was drawing from was in fact the RED jar, how many
points are earned by those who made a choice?
d. If the jar of balls your group was drawing from was in fact the BLUE jar, how many
points are earned by those who made a choice?
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6. Consider the following scenario in a round. 4 members of your group decide to make a
choice and 2 of these members choose RED.
a. How many members of your group made NO CHOICE?
b. What is your group’s decision?
c. If the jar of balls your group was drawing from was in fact the RED jar, how many points
are earned by those who made a choice?
d. If the jar of balls your group was drawing from was in fact the BLUE jar, how many
points are earned by those who made a choice?
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